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INTRODUCTION
The special verdict, viewed today as a means for court con-
trol over the jury,' has evolved as a pragmatic response of medi-
eval juries to the burdens placed upon them. In early English
law the inquest, of which the jury was a constituent part, was
a method of proof imported by the Normans and was an alter-
native to ordeal, battle and wager of oath.2 The resolutions
provided by the latter methods of proof were final, since they
were directed by the supernatural. 3 The inquest and the jury
were early recognized to be human and fallible institutions,
however, and some means of encouraging accuracy and correct-
ing error was desired.4 The means developed was the attaint.5
If the inquest jury's verdict was challenged, an attaint jury, a
more numerous body composed of as many as twenty-four ju-
rors,' was assembled to pass on the verdict of the first jury. If
the inquest jury was found to have given a false verdict, the
jurors stood convicted of perjury7 and were severely punished,8
1. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.15 (1965). Justices Douglas and Black dissented
to the 1963 amendments to FED. R. CIv. PROc. 49 on the ground that special verdicts
were a means of excessive judicial control over the jury. See 374 U.S. 865, 867-68 (1963).
2. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE
L.J. 575 (1923).
3. Id.
4. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *389.
5. A thorough discussion of the origins and development of the attaint as a form
of jury control may be found in 1 W. HOLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 337 et.
seq. (3d ed. 1922).
6. Id. at 339.
7. "They supposed that .. the proof of fact must be always so clear, that, if [the
jury] found a wrong verdict, they must be wilfully and corruptly perjured." 3 BLACK-
STONE, supra note 4, at *389. Attaching the penalty of perjury to the jurors was not
illogical. Rendition of a false verdict was tantamount to false swearing since the evolv-
ing jury still retained its character as an assemblage of witnesses. See 1 HoLDSWORTH,
supra note 4, at 337, 342.
8. "[The jurors] were imprisoned, their lands forfeited, their wives and children
turned out of their possessions, and their goods forfeited to the King, and themselves
outlawed." 1 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 27 (3d ed. 1952).
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and the inquest judgment was overturned.'
The province of the early jury was probably not limited to
findings of fact alone.'0 Although questions of both fact and law
were commonly submitted for determination by inquest ju-
ries," the practice developed in the early thirteenth century for
juries to return verdicts in which the facts of the case were
determined, but the more difficult determination and applica-
tion of the law was left to the court. 2 By this means, the jury
could pass responsibility for an erroneous judgment from them-
selves to the judges.' 3 Blackstone noted two ways in which a
jury might make findings of fact but avoid the riskier applica-
tion of the law:
Sometimes, if there arises in the case of any difficult mat-
ter of law, the jury, for the sake of better information, to avoid
the danger of having their verdict attainted, will find a
special verdict: which is grounded on the statute of Westm.
2, 13 Edw. 1., c. 30, § 2. And herein they state the naked facts,
as they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the
court thereon; concluding conditionally, that if upon the
whole matter the court should be of the opinion that the
plaintiff had cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff;
if otherwise, then for the defendant ...
Another method of finding a species of special verdict, is
when the jury find a verdict generally for the plaintiff, but
subject nevertheless to the opinion of the judge of the court
above, on a special case stated by counsel of both sides with
regard to a matter of law .... ,1
The statute referred to by Blackstone was enacted in the year
1285 and expressly granted juries the right to return a special
9. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 337-38.
10. Morgan, supra note 2, at 575-77.
11. The function of the early jury was to announce "a simple statement of result,
with no explanation of what facts were found or rules applied." Comment, Special
Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 483, 485 (1965)
(footnote omitted).
12. Morgan, supra note 2, at 576-80. The rationale was explained by Coke as
follows:
Although the jurie if they will take upon them the knowledge of the law, may
give a generall verdict, yet it is dangerous for them so to doe, for if they doe
mistake the law, they run into the danger of an attaint; therefore to find the
speciall matter is the safest way where the case is doubtfull.
2 E. COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LrrrLsrON § 368 (1st Amer., from 19th London ed.
1853).
13. Id. at 586.
14. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *377-78.
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verdict in specified cases. Nevertheless, interpretations of the
statute recognized that it was but a declaration and affirmance
of the common law. 5
Thus the special verdict originally developed not as a judi-
cial check on the jury, but rather as a means of self-protection
for the jurors. Since the medieval judges might also be held
accountable for an erroneous application of the law,"6 there was
little inducement to encroach upon the province of the jury. To
the contrary, "the evidence is clear that the contest between
justices and the jurors was not one for the enlargement of juris-
diction, but for the evasion of responsibility."' 7 The use of the
special verdict expanded over the years by means of judicial
interpretation, and by the early part of the seventeenth century
it was an established proposition that a jury could return a
special verdict on any issue in any case, whether civil or crimi-
nal. 8
While the special verdict flourished, the reason for its insti-
gation slowly disappeared. The public came to view the attaint
as too harsh a remedy,19 and when attaint juries were assem-
bled, they tended to affirm the findings of the original jury in
order to avoid imposition of the penalty." By the late sixteenth
century attaints were seldom put into use,2' and the procedure
was belatedly eliminated by statute in 1825.22 In the meantime
courts had begun to resort to new trials in order to remedy
improper verdicts.2 3
The special verdict had its Wisconsin statutory origin in the
Laws of 1856,24 with modification in 1874 and 1878. In the origi-
nal enactment, the special verdict was defined as "that by
which the jury find the facts only leaving the judgment to the
court." 21 The Wisconsin Supreme Court's first interpretation of
15. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 257 (1920).
16. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 213-14.
17. Morgan, supra note 2, at 586.
18. Id. at 588-89.
19. Objection to the attaint was aptly stated by Blackstone: "[Blut the remedy,
which they have provided, shows the ignorance and ferocity of the times ...... 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *389.
20. See 1 HOLDSWORTH at 342; J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 139
(1898).
21. See 1 HoLDSWORTH, qupra note 5, at 342-43.
22. Juries Act of 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, § 60.
23. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *404.
24. 1856 Wis. Laws, ch. 120, §§ 170-172.
25. 1856 Wis. Laws, ch. 120, § 170.
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the special verdict statute, in Ryan v. Rockford Insurance Co.,',
stated that the purpose of the statute was "to secure a direct
answer free from any bias or prejudice in favor of or against
either party. '27
The first modification of the common-law special verdict,
as authorized by the Laws of 1856, occurred in 1874 when the
legislature amended the law2n to require the court to submit a
special verdict as a matter of right if timely requested by a
party. The special verdict was no longer the option of the jury,
but the right of a litigant. This was the most significant change
in the special verdict from that described by Blackstone. In
1878 a further change was made which authorized the court in
its discretion, when the case presented only questions of law,
to direct the jury to render a special verdict subject to the
opinion of the court.29 In contrast to the 1874 amendment, this
change was merely a statutory adoption of a species of
common-law verdict described long previously by Blackstone.
The preference for special verdicts continues apace in Wis-
consin after 125 years of use in its trial courts. The recently
adopted Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure have made special
verdicts the ordinary form of verdict submission and have elim-
inated the need for a timely request for such a form of verdict.30
The special verdict must be distinguished from the general
verdict with special interrogatories.31 Use of general verdicts32
makes it difficult if not impossible to ascertain the elements
which entered into and formed the verdict of the jury.3 3 The
26. 77 Wis. 611, 46 N.W. 885 (1890).
27. Id. at 615, 46 N.W. at 886.
28. 1874 Wis. Laws, ch. 194, § 1.
29. Wis. REv. STAT. § 2858 (1878). See Murphy v. Interlake Paper & Pulp Co., 162
Wis. 139, 155 N.W. 925 (1916); Keena v. American Box Toe Co., 144 Wis. 231, 128
N.W. 858 (1910); Baumann v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 118 Wis. 330, 95 N.W. 139 (1903).
30. Wis. STAT. § 805.12 (1973). See Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil
Procedure: Chapters 805-807, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 671, 697-98 (1976).
31. Morgan, supra note 2.
32. "[A] special verdict is that by which the jury finds the facts only, leaving the
judgment to the court. A general verdict is one by which the jury pronounces upon all
or any of the issues either in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant." Boneck v. Herman,
247 Wis. 592, 595, 20 N.W.2d 664, 666 (1945).
33. The peculiarity of the general verdict is the merger into a single indivisi-
ble residuum of all matters, however numerous, whether of law or fact. It is a
compound made by the jury which is incapable of being broken up into its
constituent parts. No judicial reagents exist for either a qualitative or quantita-
tive analysis. The law supplies the means for determining neither what facts
were found, nor what principles of law were applied, nor how the application
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tutory authorization has been removed, however, by repeal of
Wisconsin Statutes section 270.27 and the absence of a compa-
rable provision in section 805.12 of the new rules of civil proce-
dure.
This attempt to set forth the principles of special verdict
formulation will be confined to civil cases. The use of special
verdicts in criminal cases is not practiced in Wisconsin Histor-
ically, special verdicts in criminal cases were the prerogative of
the jury to avoid attaint.4' At the present time, however, the
question whether special verdicts survive in criminal cases is
more historical than practical. Nevertheless, it was not long
ago, in City of Milwaukee v. Wuky, 41 that a special verdict was
disapproved in an ordinance forfeiture case employing a crimi-
nal procedure, although denominated a civil action.
The following discussion will necessarily be oriented heavily
to negligence cases. These cases encompass a large area of tort
law in Wisconsin (including medical malpractice, products lia-
bility, safe place, safety statute and many property nuisance
actions) and form a large part of litigation. Negligence actions
also tend to provide patterns more often than other tort or
contract cases.
Special verdict formulation has been consigned to the
"sound discretion" of the trial court.4 3 Nevertheless, most
trial judges desire more input from trial lawyers than is cus-
tomarily received. 4 The collection of announced principles in
a framework of rules for special verdict formulation may aid in
the framing of special verdicts and stimulate trial counsel's
assistance to trial judges.
The special verdict "rules" which follow must be prefaced,
however, with a caveat best expressed by Thoreau: "Any fool
can make a rule/And every fool will mind it.''45 The evidentiary
facts are so infinite that it is impossible to structure the princi-
41. Attaint was certainly not as serious a threat in criminal cases as it was in civil
actions at common law. According to Holdsworth, "[N]o one ever seems to have
thought that [attaint] would lie against a jury who had found a verdict of guilty upon
an indictment." 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 340. The commentators disagreed as
to the applicability of attaint where a jury acquitted the accused. Id.
42. 26 Wis. 2d 555, 133 N.W.2d 356 (1965).
43. Dahl v. K-Mart, 46 Wis. 2d 605, 609, 176 N.W.2d 342, 344 (1970).
44. Although Wis. STAT. § 805.12(1) (1973) requires the court to formulate the
special verdict, the trial judge may direct counsel to submit proposed or requested
special verdict forms.
45. H. Thoreau, Journal (entry of Feb. 3, 1860).
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ples announced in the case law into the form of commands. At
best, they are guidelines, to be discarded whenever logic and
human experience suggest a different course.
I. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT
A. The Sequential Arrangement of the Questions Should Be
Logical.
Calling for a logical arrangement of special verdict ques-
tions states a goal rather than a method. The adversary
method, with the plaintiff proceeding first correlative to his
burden of proof, suggests that the first special verdict question
should inquire about the defendant's conduct. As chronology is
frequently the better guide to formulating a direct examina-
tion, so may it serve as a basis for the special verdict, particu-
larly in contract cases where the issues are framed in specific
factual questions. On the other hand, in negligence cases, the
fact that the plaintiff has the right to open and close lends itself
to inquiries about conduct of the defendant first, although the
plaintiff's contributory negligence may have antedated the
negligence of the defendant.
Specific fact inquiries, if incorporated in the special verdict,
might well be positioned ahead of general inquiries applying a
broad standard of conduct. Similarly, defenses dependent
upon the resolution of a particular issue of fact may call for
specific questions and should precede those with respect to
broader questions of ultimate fact. This method of requiring
the jury to consider specific inquiries before more general ques-
tions should result in the application of a more logical reason-
ing process. A suggested sequence of special verdict questions
is:
a. Inquiry with respect to the defendant's conduct.
b. Inquiry with respect to each defendant's conduct as a
cause of the plaintiff's loss46 (if a negligence case).
c. Inquiry with respect to the negligence of a third-party
defendant or persons not parties whose conduct may arguably
constitute negligence (if a negligence case).
d. Inquiry about causation of conduct described in (c) (if a
negligence case).
46. Loss is a general term used here for brevity. As will be discussed later, the
inquiry should specify injury, accident or collision to be properly phrased and to avoid
an improper comparison. See Part III, sec. E infra.
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e. Inquiry with respect to the plaintiff's conduct.
f. Inquiry with respect to the plaintiff's conduct as a cause
of his loss (if a negligence case).
g. In a negligence case, a comparative negligence question.
h. Inquiry with respect to each plaintiffs damages.47
i. Inquiry with respect to the damage of each counter-
claiming or cross-claiming defendant.
The format of inquiring first about the defendant's conduct
and second about the plaintiff's conduct is correlative to the
right of the plaintiff to open and close. The complaint attacks
the defendant's conduct and asserts a basis of liability. Simi-
larly, the third-party complaint or cross-claim asserts liability
to another defendant arising from his liability to the plaintiff
or from the same transaction, occurrence or property in-
volved.48
In the case of multiple plaintiffs or defendants represented
by different attorneys, the trial court may be required to rule
upon the order and mode of presenting evidence and interro-
gating witnesses. The statute49 and the case law establish the
guidelines to be applied by the court, but in the absence of
compelling considerations, the order of the plaintiffs and de-
fendants in the title to the action is the most usual. The same
sequence seems appropriate in the special verdict inquiries-
i.e., inquiring about defendants in the order of the title and
the same order with respect to the plaintiffs. However, the
order in which persons are inquired about is within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. Inquiry about the conduct of released
parties before the question with respect to the sole remaining
party is not error.5'
B. It May Be Necessary To Inquire About Those Who Are
Not Parties to the Litigation.
A special verdict must inquire about negligence and causa-
tion of all parties to the transaction whether or not they are
parties to the action and whether or not they are unknown to
47. In Loizzo v. Conforti, 207 Wis. 129, 240 N.W. 790 (1932) insertion of a plaintiff's
damage question in the middle of the special verdict after the defendant's cause ques-
tion, and before inquiries with respect to the plaintiff's negligence, and causation, was
disapproved.
48. wis. STAT. §§ 802.07(3), 803.05(1) (1973).
49. Wis. STAT. § 906.11(1) (1973).
50. Schueler v. City of Madison, 49 Wis. 2d 695, 183 N.W.2d 116 (1971).
51. Nolan v. Venus Ford, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 215, 218 N.W.2d 507 (1974).
1977]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the parties" or immune to liability by settlement53 or operation
of law.54 Also, the jury must be afforded the opportunity to
compare the negligence of such a party to the occurrence.5 In
a third-party action pursuant to the Worker's Compensation
Act,5" the employer's negligence will usually be in issue and
inquiry must be made in the special verdict. The trial judge
formulating the special verdict should apply this standard with
respect to nonparty negligence: "Is there evidence of conduct
which, if believed by the jury, would constitute negligence on
the part of the person or other legal entity inquired about?"' 7
Third-party actions pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section
102.29 present a special problem.58 If the employer has provided
an unsafe place of employment, the tendency of a jury is to
weigh that more heavily in the comparison than the negligence
of a third party such as the premises owner or the machinery
manufacturer. Thus, the employer is often found more negli-
gent than the third party. This situation is further complicated
by the logical inference that if the place of employment is
unsafe, then it is probable that the jury will find the worker
plaintiff negligent in working under such circumstances. To
compensate for such an inference, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court suggests:
[I]n the employee situation . . .contributory negligence
• ..carries with it . . .a different obligation upon an em-
ployee than upon another who may be on allegedly unsafe
premises only for his own purposes. An employee, when at
work in a place of employment is there because of the direc-
tions of his employer. In Beck v. Siemers (1921), 174 Wis. 437,
183 N.W. 157, the court stated that, under the safe place
52. Inquiry with respect to the negligence of a "phantom driver" (one whose exist-
ence may be in dispute but at least whose identity is unknown) is a frequent circum-
stance in bus passenger or expressway litigation.
53. See, e.g., Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963) (release).
54. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 102.03 (1973) (Worker's Compensation Act exclusion of
liability).
55. Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 154 (1976); Connar
v. West Shore Equipment, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975); Payne v. Bilco,
54 Wis. 2d 424, 195 N.W.2d 641 (1972); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d
106 (1963).
56. Wis. STAT. § 102.29 (1973), as amended.
57. Connar v. West Shore Equipment, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 45, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662
(1975).
58. See Piper, Problems in Third Party Action Procedure Under the Wisconsin
Worker' Compensation Act, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 91 (1976).
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statute, merely to continue with the work directed by the
employer although the premises are unsafe does not consti-
tute contributory negligence. The court in Beck advised:
"[I]t would seem best in cases of this character to in-
struct the jury that merely continuing in an employ-
ment and doing work as intended by the employer and
the employee in the usual and ordinary manner, al-
though the place of work or appliance is unsafe, does not
constitute contributory negligence."'"
Also involved in determining contributory negligence of an
employee is the decreased duty of care when a worker is preoc-
cupied with his work. When the evidence presents such a cir-
cumstance, Wisconsin Jury Instruction-Civil Number 1051,
"Duty of Workman: Preoccupation in Work Minimizes Duty,"
should be given.
C. Separate Inquiries About Negligence and Causation Are
Proper But Not Required.
In 1961 the Wisconsin Supreme Court amended Wisconsin
Statute section 270.27 to permit a general (ultimate fact) in-
quiry with respect to negligence."0 Eliminated was the earlier
requirement that the inquiry be directed specifically to items
of negligence such as lookout, speed, management and control,
and right of way. A simple special verdict combining negli-
gence and causation into one question was rejected in Baierl v.
Hinshaw"' as not in conformity with section 270.27. In a lengthy
recital of the history behind the form of special verdict modifi-
cation permitted by the amendment to section 270.27, the
court relied upon the following statutory phrase to justify its
conclusion that negligence and causation could not be com-
bined: "[T]he court may submit separate questions as to the
negligence of each party, and whether such negligence was a
cause ."62
Section 270.27 was substantially redrafted in its present
form as section 805.12(1) and the phrase quoted above was
deleted. 3 The Judicial Council Committee Note to the section
59. McCrossen v. Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co., 59 Wis. 2d 245, 255, 208 N.W.2d
148 (1973).
60. Supreme Court Order, 11 Wis. 2d v (effective June 1, 1961).
61. 32 Wis. 2d 593, 147 N.W.2d 433 (1966).
62. Wis. STAT. § 270.27 (1965).
63. The statute presently provides as follows:
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acknowledges that the redrafted section "is generally based"
upon section 270.27.64 Although the Wisconsin law as discussed
above has heretofore required inquiries of negligence and caus-
ation to be separately stated, that practice is no longer ex-
pressly required by statute.65
The net effect of redrafting section 805.12(1) appears to be
a reversal of Baierl and a restoration of Wisconsin Jury
Instruction-Civil Number 1001 as a proper method of submis-
sion, irrespective of consent of the parties. It would seem that
in view of the January 1, 1976, statutory amendment, the fol-
lowing statement is appropriate not only to a general negli-
gence inquiry as it was when made, but also to a combination
of negligence and causation:
The main argument by appellant is that there should
have been a verdict on individual items of negligence and the
trial court abused his discretion in failing to submit the case
that way. This is nothing more than a reargument of the
propriety of an ultimate-fact verdict. The proper way to
change the rule is in a proceeding to change the rule, not in
an individual case. On the merits the appellant presents
nothing more than the usual arguments in favor of the
particular-item verdict as against the ultimate-fact verdict.
That the ultimate-fact verdict permits the jury to do better
what it most practically does, namely, look at the overall
negligence of the parties and attach the blame accordingly
without being trapped by technicalities and inconsistencies
when considering the negligence of the parties piecemeal,
remains as the most-effective argument for the use of the
ultimate-fact verdict.' 5-
805.12 Special verdicts. (1) UsE. Unless it orders otherwise, the court shall
direct the jury to return a special verdict. The verdict shall be prepared by the
court in the form of written questions relating only to material issues of ultimate
fact and admitting a direct answer. The jury shall answer in writing. In cases
founded upon negligence, the court need not submit separately any particular
respect in which the party was allegedly negligent. The court may also direct
the jury to find upon particular questions of fact.
64. 67 Wis. 2d at 703 (1975).
65. Some states which adopted Wisconsin-type comparative negligence have sim-
plified their special verdict forms by such a combination. See PROPOSED KANSAS PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 20.04-.05. See also James, Connecticut's Comparative Negli-
gence Statute: An Analysis of Some Problems, 1974 INs. L.J. 375.
65.1. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.,
23 Wis. 2d 662, 666, 128 N.W.2d 12, 14 (1964).
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D. Where the Law Requires Expert Testimony To Establish
Negligence or Causation, in The Absence of Such Testimony,
a Question Should Not Be Submitted.
[T]he requirement of expert testimony is an "extra-
ordinary one," and is to be applied by the trial court "only
when unusually complex or esoteric issues are before the
jury.66
The matter involved must be "not within the realm of the
ordinary experience of mankind." 7 Determined on a case by
case basis, expert testimony has been required to establish: the
necessity of medical or dental care to promote healing;" perma-
nency of an injury;69 whether pain will continue into the future
and for how long a period; 70 whether future medical expenses
will be incurred; 7' whether a fall occurred because of a prior leg
injury;72 whether a piece of bone caused a pulmonary blood
clot;73 whether a driver's conduct after injury was caused by
shock; 74 malpractice from allegedly improper or inadequate
treatment (in the absence of res ipsa loquitur situations) ;75 the
cause of a barn fire;7" the cause of death of heifers; 77 the cause
of a person's death if a medical expert testifies that the test
used by a layman cannot determine the cause of death;78 an
injured person's future medical expenses and future pain and
66. Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 186 N.W.2d 258, 262 (1971).
See also Holz, A Survey of Rules Governing Medical Proof in Wisconsin-1970, 1970
Wis. L. REv. 989.
67. 51 Wis. 2d at 6, 186 N.W.2d at 261; Cramer v. Theda Clark Memorial Hosp.,
45 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 172 N.W.2d 427, 428 (1969).
68. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 263 Wis. 380, 57 N.W.2d 334 (1953).
69. Borowske v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Wis. 2d 93, 121 N.W.2d 287 (1963);
Lubner v. Peerless Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 364, 120 N.W.2d 54 (1963); Rogers v. Adams,
19 Wis. 2d 141, 119 N.W.2d 349 (1963).
70. Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 140 N.W.2d 748 (1966); Huss v. Vande Hey,
29 Wis. 2d 34, 138 N.W.2d 192 (1965).
71. Sawdey v. Schwenk, 2 Wis. 2d 532, 87 N.W.2d 500 (1958).
72. Globe Steel Tubes Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 495, 29 N.W.2d 510
(1947).
73. Behr v. Larson, 275 Wis. 620, 83 N.W.2d 157 (1957).
74. Odya v. Quade, 4 Wis. 2d 63, 90 N.W.2d 96 (1958).
75. McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964); Fehrman v. Smirl,
20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963).
76. Kreyer v. Farmer's Cooperative Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d 67, 117 N.W.2d 646
(1962).
77. Peterson v. Greenway, 25 Wis. 2d 493, 131 N.W.2d 343 (1964).
78. Novakofski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 154, 148 N.W.2d 714
(1967); Lubner v. Peerless Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 364, 120 N.W.2d 54 (1963).
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suffering;79 the identity of a dangerous drug;8" an award for
impairment of future earning capacity when premised upon
post-traumatic neurosis; 8' and the relationship between neu-
rosis and traumatic neurosis;" hysteria;83 emotional disturb-
ances;84 personality changes; 85 aggravation of a cancerous
tumor;"6 and heart failure. 7 When questions of negligence or
causation require expert testimony and none is adduced, there
is a failure of proof 8 and no special verdict question on that
subject may be submitted to the jury.89
II. THE GENERAL EXTENT OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS
Question formulation requires a sense of proportion in at-
tempting to reconcile many competing and sometimes contra-
dictory strictures. Issues should not be split, yet a verdict
should not be so broad as to constitute a general verdict. The
questions should resolve each disputed issue of material fact,
but the questions should not constitute needless multiplicity,
verbosity, or cross-examination of the jury, nor lead the jury
into inconsistency. By court rule amending the special verdict
statute," a general question of ultimate fact negligence may be
79. Spleas v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 21 Wis. 2d 635, 124 N.W.2d
593 (1963); Rogers v. Adams, 19 Wis. 2d 141, 119 N.W.2d 349 (1963); Diemel v. Weir-
ich, 264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
80. State v. Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d 561, 196 N.W.2d 717 (1972).
81. Peterson v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 5 Wis. 2d 535, 93 N.W.2d 433 (1958).
82. Riehl v. DeQuaine, 24 Wis. 2d 23, 127 N.W.2d 788 (1964); McMahon v. Berge-
son, 9 Wis. 2d 256, 101 N.W.2d 63 (1960); Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d
584, 93 N.W.2d 439 (1958); Landrath v. Allstate Ins. Co., 259 Wis. 248, 48 N.W.2d 485
(1951); Heindel v. Wisconsin Traction, Light, Heat & Power Co., 169 Wis. 181, 171
N.W. 938 (1919).
83. Gallagher v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 361, 101 N.W.2d 72 (1960).
84. Cf. Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956);
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (by implication).
85. Paepcke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 263 Wis. 290, 57 N.W.2d 352 (1953).
86. City of Seymour v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 Wis. 2d 482, 131 N.W.2d 323 (1964).
87. Vogelsburg v. Mason & Hanger Co., 250 Wis. 242, 26 N.W.2d 678 (1947); Jerber
v. Wloszczynski, 188 Wis. 344, 206 N.W. 206 (1925). See also Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.
2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
88. But cf. Cedarburg Light & Water Comm'n v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 33 Wis.
2d 560, 148 N.W.2d 13 (1967) (expert testimony not required to prove causation).
89. Hargrove v. Peterson, 65 Wis. 2d 118, 221 N.W.2d 875 (1974); Wisconsin Build-
ers, Inc. v. General Ins. Co., 65 Wis. 2d 91, 221 N.W.2d 832 (1974); Johnson v. Heintz,
61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973). See also Cramer v. Theda Clark Memorial
Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 172 N.W.2d 427 (1969); Bruss v. Milwaukee Sporting Goods Co.,
34 Wis. 2d 688, 150 N.W.2d 337 (1967).
90. Supreme Court Order, 11 Wis. 2d v (effective June 1, 1961).
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submitted with the instructions covering the varying specific
kinds of negligence litigated (i.e., lookout, speed, etc.).
The ultimate fact form of verdict is not limited to negli-
gence cases.9' It may be applied to all forms of issues, contract,
tort or property. However, issues other than negligence do not
always lend themselves to an ultimate fact question because of
the interaction of several legal principles.
In Peil v. Kohnke92 an insurance company attempted to
avoid coverage on the ground of misrepresentation by its in-
sured. To successfully avoid coverage, the company was re-
quired to establish that: (1) the representation was false; and
either (2) the false representation was made with intent to
deceive; or alternatively, (3) the false representation was mate-
rial, i.e., it increased the risk or contributed to the loss. 3 Each
of those three elements was a question of fact. 4 The trial court
framed the question: "Did the defendant, Delmar Kohnke,
falsely represent to the Badger State Mutual Casualty Com-
pany any material facts concerning the ownership or use of the
1965 Cadillac automobile?"' 5 Apparently there was no evidence
of intent to deceive, thus materiality of the false representation
was required. The jury was correctly instructed that to answer
the question "yes," they must find false representations and
materiality. The supreme court concluded: "[I]t was erro-
neous for the trial court here to submit a single question on the
coverage wherein the jury was asked to determine both factors:
(1) the fact of false representations, and (2) materiality."'"
In Schrank v. Allstate Insurance Co.,97 decided the same
day as Peil, the court reviewed a jury's findings of noncausal
negligence by the defendant driver in a pedestrian-automobile
91. Naden v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 375, 212 N.W.2d 585 (1973) (breach of buyer-
seller contract); Repinski v. Clintonville Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 49 Wis. 2d 53,
181 N.W.2d 351 (1970) (breach of mortgage loan commitment).
92. 50 Wis. 2d 168, 184 N.W.2d 433 (1971).
93. Wis. STAT. § 209.06 (1973); Stockinger v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 245,
128 N.W.2d 433 (1964); Langlois v. Wisconsin Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 151, 119
N.W.2d 400, 120 N.W.2d 884 (1963).
94. See cases cited supra note 56.
95. 50 Wis. 2d at 198, 184 N.W.2d at 449.
96. Id. at 211, 184 N.W.2d at 455.
97. 50 Wis. 2d 247, 184 N.W.2d 127 (1971); cf. Rud v. McNamara, 10 Wis. 2d 41,
102 N.W.2d 248 (1960), where the court stated it was not convinced that the four
elements of actionable fraud should be separated into four inquiries in the special
verdict.
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accident. Although the child pedestrian darted into the path
of the defendant's car, the evidence relied upon for liability was
testimony that the driver could have seen the child sooner and
that the child was dragged either a disputed 100 feet or ten feet
after impact. The court concluded that the evidence sustained
a finding that the driver was negligent in not seeing the child
sooner; that the evidence did not establish that the child was
dragged more than ten feet; that the driver could not have
stopped sooner if the child had earlier been seen; and that there
was an absence of causal effect. The difficulty in reviewing the
findings of the Peil jury and the Schrank jury was caused in
each instance by a cumulative fact question. In the negligence
case, however, it prompted no criticism of the question formu-
lation because of the special provision of the special verdict
statute authorizing an ultimate fact negligence question.
In special verdict question formulation one should avoid the
too-specific questions that lead to issue division, multiplicity,
jury cross-examination and verdict inconsistency, and at the
same time avoid combining ultimate facts into one question
equivalent to a general verdict. A review of the cases suggests
that such proportion can be achieved if at the time of question
formulation one identifies those factual issues that on motions
after verdict or appeal will present a difficult question of law.
If a serious question will be presented with respect to whether
the law will prohibit or compel liability (a policy or sufficiency-
of-the-evidence determination), then it may be administra-
tively desirable to separate rather than accumulate specific
issues to enable the trial or appellate court to know exactly
what the jury did. Such a suggestion does not intimate that,
because an appeal may or will be taken, the special verdict
question should be more detailed. 8
Counsel for the parties should be especially prepared in
instances where an appeal may be taken because it may be
desirable to submit questions in the more detailed form of spe-
cial verdict in order to isolate the special findings of the jury
and to enable the trial judge to determine which evidence the
jury accepted or rejected. That practice may obviate the need
for a new trial. Even a products liability special verdict may
lend itself to this treatment where several issues of product
defectiveness are presented.
98. Zartner v. Scopp, 28 Wis. 2d 205, 137 N.W.2d 107 (1965).
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A. A Special Verdict Should Not Consist of So Many Ques-
tions that It Constitutes Needless Multiplicity or Verbosity or
Leads the Jury into Inconsistency.
Material ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts, are the mat-
ters about which inquiry should be made.9 A twenty-seven
question verdict containing three questions on "proximate
cause," one of which covered the subject and the other two of
which cross-examined the jury was, of course, disapproved.,"
In Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co. " the supreme court was
particularly critical of the special verdict framed by the trial
judge:
So by submitting the four questions instead of one, the rule
was violated that immaterial matters should not be included
in the special verdict; also the rule was violated that ques-
tions should not be so framed as to cross-question the jury,
and the further rule was violated that no question should be
included in a special verdict not covering a distinct issuable
controverted fact. 0 2
In Mauch v. City of Hartford"°3 the court analyzed a twenty-
one question verdict and illustrated that only five questions
were necessary. It found that the twenty-one question verdict
improperly split issues, dealt with evidentiary rather than ulti-
mate facts, and submitted inquiries upon which there was no
evidence. The court rejected a mass of questions that would
lead to jury confusion and elicit conflicting answers. In
Eberhardt v. Sanger"4 the court found error in a thirty-seven
question verdict where there were but two issues of material
fact.
A minute cross-examination of the jury by multitudinous
questions should be discountenanced by the trial court so that
"the special verdict is not used to entrap the jury into error." ' 5
A classic case of special verdict question verbosity is Hoffman
99. Wis. STAT. § 805.12(1) (1973); Kellner v. Christiansen, 169 Wis. 390, 172 N.W.
796 (1919); Wawrzyniakowski v. Hoffman & Billings Mfg. Co., 146 Wis. 153, 131 N.W.
429 (1911); Cullen v. Hanisch, 114 Wis. 24, 89 N.W. 900 (1902).
100. Okonski v. Pennsylvania & Ohio Fuel Co., 114 Wis. 448, 90 N.W. 429 (1902).
101. 129 Wis. 98, 108 N.W. 48 (1906).
102. Id. at 113, 108 N.W. at 53.
103. 112 Wis. 40, 87 N.W. 816 (1901).
104. 51 Wis. 72, 8 N.W. 111 (1881).
105. Haley v. Jump River Lumber Co., 81 Wis. 412, 427, 51 N.W. 321, 51 N.W. 956,
958 (1892).
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to the spirit of the special verdict statute. ' Thus a question,
"Was the defendant guilty of negligence in allowing the plain-
tiff to work upon its log-deck?" is an improper special verdict
submission that cannot be rectified by a proper charge."'
Terms that are confusing and meaningless to lay persons
should be avoided. For example, when the defense to an action
for defamation is conditional privilege and the question is
whether the conditional privilege is applicable because abused,
the inquiry should avoid the term "malice" and the question
should be framed in terms of abuse of privilege." 2
E. Only Issues Pleaded (or Actually Tried) and Supported by
Evidence Sufficient To Support an Affirmative Jury Finding
Should Be Incorporated in the Question.
The duty of the trial judge in determining the issues to be
submitted to the jury has been succinctly stated:
In drafting a special verdict the trial court must first con-
sider the issues raised by the pleadings. He should then elimi-
nate from the issues so raised those that are determined by
the evidence on the trial by admissions, by uncontradicted
proof or by failure of proof. Only those remaining should go
to the jury."'
An issue not supported by evidence sufficient to sustain an
affirmative jury finding should not be submitted."' Where the
evidence would not warrant an answer favorable to the party
requesting the question, it should be refused."15 When an issue
is raised after the verdict has been returned (imputing negli-
gence of a vehicle operator to the owner of a different vehicle)
that was neither pleaded, tried, nor coverd by the jury instruc-
tions, and the issue could not be decided as a matter of law, it
must be rejected."'
110. Sladkey v. Marinette Lumber Co., 107 Wis. 250, 83 N.W. 514 (1900).
111. Id.; see also Olwell v. Skobis, 126 Wis. 308, 105 N.W. 777 (1905); but see
Barnes v. Stacy, 79 Wis. 55 (1891), an early case in which the trial court included a
general verdict question as the last question of a special verdict and the supreme court
approved the practice.
112. Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966).
113. Bell v. Duesing, 275 Wis. 47, 53, 80 N.W.2d 821, 824 (1957); see also Brophy
v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 251 Wis. 558, 30 N.W. 2d 76 (1947).
114. Wisconsin Builders, Inc. v. General Ins. Co., 65 Wis. 2d 91, 221 N.W.2d 832
(1974); Peter M. Chalik & Assoc. v. Hermes, 56 Wis. 2d 151, 201 N.W.2d 514 (1972).
115. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Matson, 256 Wis. 304, 41 N.W.2d 268 (1950); Hanson
v. Johnson, 141 Wis. 550, 124 N.W. 506 (1910).
116. Soczka v. Rechner, 73 Wis. 2d 157, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976).
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Contributory negligence is usually pleaded; however, if it is
not, should the question of such negligence be submitted to the
jury if evidence supports such a contention? In Part I, section
B, the need for inclusion of inquiries about all whose conduct
may have constituted negligence was discussed. The context of
that discussion was negligence of persons who are defendants
or who might have been defendants if joined, whether or not
immune or released from liability. Such inquiries are justified
to achieve accuracy in the jury comparison inquiry. The same
reason exists for inquiring with respect to contributory negli-
gence, although not pleaded, if there is an evidentiary basis. In
addition, the failure to plead contributory negligence is easily
corrected by amendment during or after trial."7 The amend-
ment statute is remedial, accords the trial court wide discretion
and should be liberally construed."" Further, it seems improba-
ble that the plaintiff ordinarily would be surprised or ill-
equipped to meet the issue of contributory negligence.
A verdict question not presented by the evidence is a ground
for a new trial if it is prejudicially misleading."9 However, an
additional special question of fact, although not an ultimate
fact, is proper when such a fact is a central focus of the evi-
dence.120
The trial courts have been admonished that where an issue
of fact is not present or controverted in the case, and is not
submitted to the jury as a factual issue, an instruction on that
subject should not be given even though it is a proper abstract
of the law. 121 However, if not timely objected to, the error is
waived. Unless prejudicial, the instruction is mere surplusage
and a new trial is not warranted. The test to be applied in
117. Wis. STAT. § 802.09(1) (1973).
118. D.R.W. Corp. v. Cordes, 65 Wis. 2d 303, 222 N.W.2d 671 (1974); Bourassa v.
Gateway Erectors, Inc., 54 Wis. 2d 176, 194 N.W.2d 602 (1972); Siedenburg v.
Severson, 5 Wis. 2d 40, 183 N.W.2d 35 (1971); Wipfli v. Martin, 34 Wis. 2d 169, 148
N.W.2d 674 (1967); Girtz v. Oman, 21 Wis. 2d 504, 124 N.W.2d 586 (1963).
119. Wisconsin Builders, Inc. v. General Ins. Co., 65 Wis. 2d 91, 221 N.W.2d 832
(1974); Gilbert v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 2d 193, 181 N.W.2d 527 (1970);
Hoffman v. Regling, 217 Wis. 66, 258 N.W. 347 (1935). See also Behning v. Star
Fireworks Mfg. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 183, 203 N.W.2d 655 (1973), where the period of
negligence was inquired about in too restrictive a fashion; and Quick v. American
Legion 1960 Convention Corp., 36 Wis. 2d 130, 152 N.W.2d 919 (1967), where the
negligence question was directed to two defendants.
120. Dahl v. K-Mart, 46 Wis. 2d 605, 176 N.W.2d 342 (1970).
121. Wagner v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 65 Wis. 2d 243, 222 N.W.2d 652
(1974).
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determining prejudice "is the probability and not mere possi-
bility that the jury was misled thereby. '12
It is not error to neglect or refuse to submit a special verdict
question which could receive only one legitimate answer from
the evidence.'1 However, the obvious answer must be in con-
formity with the ultimate judgment in the case.'2' Such an
uncontroverted fact may be established by the trial court by a
formal finding of fact,'2 decided as a matter of law, 2 because
"[i]t would be absurd to submit a question of fact to the jury
when there is no question that the fact exists.' 12 When the
special verdict is such that the jury has no need to know of the
court's finding, it need not be brought to the jury's attention
by a special verdict question answered by the court 8 nor by
advising them of the ruling in the jury charge. 12 Although the
better practice is to submit only controverted fact questions to
the jury, it is not error to submit uncontroverted fact questions
answered by the court;' 3' however, such questions should not be
accompanied by a "general charge" that informs the jury of the
effect of the answers. 3'
A special verdict question is not defective if it incorporates
questions about uncontroverted facts, 3 2 although ordinarily
the question should not include a recital of facts."3 When the
trial court finds a fact as a matter of law, the special verdict is
complete without such an answered question on that subject. 31
Some questions such as whether one person is the agent of
another may be a mixed question of fact or law that may be
122. Lutz v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 743, 751, 235 N.W.2d 426, 431 (1975).
123. Stringham v. Cook, 75 Wis. 589, 44 N.W. 777 (1890); Weisel v. Spence, 59 Wis.
301, 18 N.W. 165 (1884).
124. Weisel v. Spence, 59 Wis. 301, 18 N.W. 165 (1884).
125. Mayhew v. Mather, 82 Wis. 355, 52 N.W. 436 (1892).
126. Koepke v. Miller, 241 Wis. 501, 6 N.W.2d 670 (1942).
127. Leiterman v. Burnette, 271 Wis. 359, 362, 73 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1955), quoting
Berg v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 50 Wis. 419, 425, 7 N.W. 347, 349 (1880).
128. Blazer v. Caldwell, 220 Wis. 270, 263 N.W. 705 (1936).
129. Id.
130. Bauman v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 118 Wis. 330, 95 N.W. 139 (1903).
131. Banderob v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 133 Wis. 249, 133 N.W. 738 (1907).
132. Meidenbauer v. Town of Pewaukee, 162 Wis. 326, 156 N.W. 144 (1916); Madi-
son v. City of Antigo, 153 Wis. 448, 141 N.W. 287 (1913); Keena v. American Box Toe
Co., 144 Wis. 231, 123 N.W. 858 (1910).
133. For a horrible example, see Hoffman v. Regling, 217 Wis. 66, 258 N.W. 347
(1935). See also Fanning v. Murphy, 126 Wis. 538, 105 N.W. 1056 (1906).
134. Murphy v. Interlake Pulp & Paper Co., 162 Wis. 139, 155 N.W. 925 (1916).
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required to be answered by the court or the jury.'35
When a determination of fact made by the court as a matter
of law is required to be known by the jury in order to answer a
question of controverted fact in the special verdict, the court
must either incorporate an answered question in the verdict or
advise the jury of the court's finding by the content of the jury
instructions.'36
Illustrative of a jury's "need to know" of a trial court's
finding as a matter of law is the court's finding that a party is
negligent, or causally negligent, as to one specific issue of negli-
gence when the ultimate fact special verdict form is used and
the evidence requires other additional issues to be submitted
to the jury through appropriate instructions. In that instance
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held the trial court should
answer the ultimate fact negligence question "yes" (including
the cause question if it is also determined as a matter of law),
and advise the jury in the instructions of the specific (causal)
negligence found.' 37 The jury must also be advised that they are
to determine other issues of negligence and causation, and the
appropriate jury instructions'3 should be given to admonish
the jury not to weigh the judge's finding more heavily than a
similar finding by the jury.
If the court answers special verdict questions of negligence
and causation as a matter of law, its answers do not suggest to
the jury that other parties are not negligent.'39 Only affirma-
tive, not negative, answers by the court as a matter of law are
to be included in the verdict. When the trial court exculpates
a party from negligence, there is no issue to submit to the jury,
and if the jury is informed of negative findings in the verdict,
it may prejudicially affect the jury's comparison of negli-
gence."
When a material issue of ultimate fact is omitted from the
verdict and is not brought to the attention of the trial court,
although necessary to sustain the judgment, the trial court is
135. Cochran v. Allyn, 16 Wis. 2d 20, 113 N.W.2d 538 (1962).
136. Chopin v. Badger Paper Co., 83 Wis. 192, 53 N.W. 452 (1892).
137. Moose v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 120, 163 N.W.2d 183 (1968);
Moritz v. Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 Wis. 2d 13, 133 N.W.2d 235 (1965).
138. WIs. J.I.-CIVIL No. 108(5) (7), 1595; with respect to a damage question an-
swered by the court, see Wis. J.I.-CIVIL No. 150.
139. Athanasiou v. Garton Toy Co., 157 Wis. 280, 147 N.W. 22 (1914).
140. Neumann v. Evans, 272 Wis. 579, 76 N.W.2d 322 (1956).
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deemed to have determined the issue in conformity with the
judgment on the jury's verdict.'
F. Special Verdicts Should Be So Drafted that Judgment in
Favor of One Party or the Other May Be Based Upon the Ver-
dict No Matter How the Jury Answers the Questions, So Long
as the Answers Are Responsive.
By incorporating questions directed to the controverted is-
sues, one usually will have selected the dispositive issues of the
case. However, the verdict as formulated may be tested by
analysis that is directed to whether the verdict as formulated
will enable the court to direct judgment for one party as well
as the other if the jury answers the questions responsively.1 2 It
should be remembered that issues of fact which are disposed
of by failure of proof or uncontradicted proof may be relied
upon by the court in support of the judgment, whether or not
they are included in the special verdict.4 3 It seems desirable
that the court indicate those matters upon the record if there
is objection to the verdict form or the instructions."' Neverthe-
less, one should not overlook the statutory cure for any omitted
issue of ultimate fact not brought to the attention of the trial
judge.4 5 The statute specifies that such an omitted issue is
deemed determined by the court in conformity with its judg-
ment, and a jury trial on such omitted issue is deemed waived
by the failure to request a finding on the issue. The case law
has held that failure to request submission of such an issue
constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury trial on that issue as
well as a waiver of the right to later object to the verdict as
submitted.'46
G. Special Questions of "Additional" Fact Are Proper.
Sometimes the issues at trial and the evidentiary disputes
are such that a standard form of special verdict strictly limited
141. Wis. STAT. § 805.12(2) (1973).
142. Stephenson v. Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co., 186 Wis. 403, 202 N.W. 798 (1925);
Schendel v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 147 Wis. 441, 133 N.W. 830 (1911).
143. See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
144. Wis. STAT. § 805.13(3) (1973).
145. Wis. STAT. § 805.12(2) (1973).
146. Johnson v. Sipe, 263 Wis. 191, 56 N.W.2d 852 (1953); Smith v. Benjamin, 261
Wis. 548, 53 N.W.2d 619 (1952); Stellmacher v. Wisco Hardware Co., 259 Wis. 310, 48
N.W.2d 492 (1951); Nimits v. Motor Transp. Co., 253 Wis. 362, 34 N.W.2d 116 (1948).
See Part VI infra.
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to questions of ultimate fact obscures rather than reveals the
jury's view of the evidence. When the fact of injury and the
source of injury is in dispute, it may not be possible to ascertain
from a standard special verdict what the jury's view was on
each of those issues. Whether or not the jury determined that
a person was acting on behalf of another as a prelude to imput-
ing negligence may be obscured in a standard special verdict.
Similarly, several acts of alleged negligence may be posed, al-
though one or more may be borderline breaches of the standard
of conduct or causation that will require review on motions
after verdict or appeal.
A special verdict is not defective because the jury's view is
not revealed with respect to each evidentiary dispute. Where
some of the issues are close questions of policy, admissibility
or sufficiency of the evidence, the trial and appellate courts
may be called upon to review the evidence. When the jury's
view of these disputes is ascertainable from the verdict, the
task of reviewing judges is frequently simplified. The jury may
have rejected the questionable evidence and adopted the
sufficiently supportable or legally appropriate view of the case
and this may be demonstrable from the verdict format.
A special question of additional fact is a useful tool to pro-
vide specific jury resolution of an evidentiary dispute. The
phrase "additional fact" is used to acknowledge that such a
fact question is not obligatory in the formulation of the special
verdict; i.e., the requirement that all issues of controverted
ultimate fact be answered may not mandate a resolution of a
lesser, nonultimate fact issue. Nevertheless, incorporation of
such a question may aid the court by obtaining the jury's spe-
cific finding on the issue. Since the verdict is adequate if it
disposes of the disputed issues of fact, the rejection of addi-
tional inquiries of fact is not error, nor is it error to include such
inquiries if there is a need.
The following questions are illustrative of a number of such
questions that have been posed: "Was the plaintiff, Isadora
Dahl, injured as a result of the malfunctioning of the door?"' 14 7
"At the time of the accident in question, was Janet Cochran
driving the automobile of the defendant, John Allyn, as his
agent?"' 48 "Did the defendant Stanley H. Price, after coming
147. Dahl v. K-Mart, 46 Wis. 2d 605, 609, 176 N.W.2d 342, 344 (1970).
148. Cochran v. Allyn, 16 Wis. 2d 20, 21, 113 N.W.2d 538, 539 (1962).
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to a stop in the vicinity of Florian's Inn on March 18, 1951, back
his Pontiac automobile?"' 49 A question inquiring whether an
ambulance was on an emergency errand in a case involving an
ambulance collision was properly refused. 150 Such questions
may relate to negligence, causation or damage. Statutory
motor vehicle safety regulations and the question of whether a
driver invaded another's half of the roadway frequently lend
themselves to special fact questions.' It has been suggested
that if supported by the evidence in a case involving a pedes-
trian struck by an auto, the initial verdict question should be,
"Was the plaintiff on the crosswalk when struck?"'52
When a special fact question has been incorporated in a
special verdict, it should override an answer to a general ques-
tion that may overlap. Thus, if the special question determines
negligence, an answer to a general question of negligence
should, if necessary, be altered by the trial court to conform to
the specific finding.'15 3
Whether an accident was "unavoidable" is a special ques-
tion which is seldom proper and the propriety of such an in-
quiry is rare. 5 '
H. Multiple Special Verdicts Involving Multiple Parties and
Separate Incidents May Be Submitted to the Jury.
Multiple occurrence cases where the claims of several plain-
tiffs are joined, but the events upon which recovery is based
have time lapses which suggest that the events are successive
occurrences and thus without joint liability present a special
problem in special verdict use. "[T]o establish joint liability
the independent torts must concur in point of time to there-
after inflict a single injury."'55 The single injury need not be
found by the court or jury to be "indivisible" but should be
such that the injuries in the successive torts are not patently
separable. The automobile negligence cases in this area involve
149. Polsfuss v. Price 272 Wis. 99, 100, 74 N.W.2d 612, 613 (1956).
150. Merlino v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 571,127 N.W. 2d 741 (1964).
151. Odya v. Quade, 4 Wis. 2d 63, 90 N.W.2d 96 (1958).
152. Smith v. Superior & Duluth Transfer Co., 243 Wis. 292, 296, 10 N.W.2d 153,
154 (1943).
153. Dahl v. K-Mart, 46 Wis. 2d 605, 176 N.W.2d 342 (1970).
154. Van Matre v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 268 Wis. 399, 67 N.W.2d
831 (1955).
155. Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 288-89, 187 N.W.2d 349,
353 (1971).
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separate impacts with a time interval of as much as twenty
minutes"'5 or personal injuries followed by negligent treatment
by a physician or hospital. 5 ' A similar circumstance is pre-
sented by an action brought by three sibling plaintiffs to re-
cover for bites by the same dog on different occasions. 151 In the
latter case, the court approved the submission of the three
claims to the jury in three separate special verdicts labeled (a),
(b) and (c). The verdicts are not quoted in the supreme court's
opinion, but they can be found in the appellant's appendix. In
approving the multiple submission, the court said, "[A]n ex-
amination of the verdict questions reflect [sic] that they were
complete and easily understandable and in the most appropri-
ate form for cases of this type involving multiple parties and
multiple incidents.' ' 59
I. Ordinarily the Question Should Be Framed To Put the
Burden on the Affirmative.
The better way to frame a special verdict question is to
submit the issue in a form that places the burden of proof on
the person who has the affirmative of the issue.60 Such ques-
tion formulation accords with the pattern jury instruction for
the ordinary burden of proof in civil cases. 6 ' That method of
formulation is designed to avoid confusion in the jury instruc-
tions on the burden of proof.'62 If the jury instructions do not
in fact confuse or erroneously instruct the jury with respect to
the burden of proof, there is no error in formulating the ques-
tion to put the burden of proof on the negative. When the
burden of proof is on the negative, care must be taken to alter
the appropriate pattern jury instructions which generally are
formulated for the preferred affirmative special verdict submis-
sion.
156. Johnson v. Heintz, 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973), 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243
N.W.2d 815 (1976).
157. Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).
158. Dawson v. Jost, 35 Wis. 2d 644, 151 N.W.2d 717 (1967).
159. Id. at 651, 151 N.W.2d at 720.
160. Gilbert v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 2d 193, 206, 181 N.W.2d 527,
534 (1970); Sloan v. Brown County State Bank, 174 Wis. 36, 182 N.W. 363 (1921);
Kausch v. Chicago & M. Elec. Ry., 173 Wis. 220, 180 N.W. 808 (1921).
161. Wls. J.I.-CIVIL No. 200.
162. Carle v. Nelson, 145 Wis. 593, 130 N.W. 467 (1911); Pennsylvania Coal &
Supply Co. v. Schmidt, 155 Wis. 242, 144 N.W. 283 (1913); Parker v. Hull, 71 Wis.
368, 37 N.W. 351 (1888).
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III. THE FORM OF NEGLIGENCE, CAUSATION AND COMPARISON
INQUIRIES 16 3
One must have in mind that the radical revision of Wiscon-
sin's special verdict statute'64 is as yet uninterpreted by judicial
decision. A more simplified special verdict than those of the
past now seems permissible. However, in discussing this sub-
ject there will be no attempt to combine the submission of
negligence and causation in one question.6 5
A. Each Question Should Be Limited to a Single Direct and
Controverted Ultimate Fact.
If issues are subdivided into evidentiary facts rather than
ultimate facts, the spirit of special verdict submission is vio-
lated and a proliferation of inquiries results. On the other hand,
an inquiry embracing more than one ultimate fact becomes a
multiple question. The jury's answer to a multiple question is
not always ascertainable and thus not responsive. 66 Where
multiple questions have been propounded, the problems raised
by conjunctive or disjunctive phraseology are necessarily en-
countered.6 7
Each question should be phrased in the simplest possible
language' 5 to elicit an answer that necessarily will be direct,
positive and intelligible, 9 and dispositive of a fact in issue 170
requisite to the determination of the controversy. 7' Brevity in
question formulation is desirable but the question should be
broad enough to address itself to the issue. The substantial
163. Most of the requisites of question formulation with respect to negligence are
also applicable to other forms of liability. Negligence was chosen as the basis of the
discussion because of the volume of that form of litigation and because the fact situa-
tions, although infinite, tend to form patterns that can be used for illustration.
164. Wis. STAT. § 805.12(1) (1973).
165. See Part I, sec. C. supra. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1001 illustrates the combination
of negligence and causation in one question termed "fault."
166. Gay v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 138 Wis. 348, 120 N.W. 283 (1909);
Goesel v. Davis, 100 Wis. 678, 76 N.W. 768 (1898); Jewell v. Chicago, St. P. & M. Ry.,
54 Wis. 610, 617, 12 N.W. 83, 85 (1882).
167. See text, Part I, sec. B infra.
168. Hoffman v. Regling, 217 Wis. 66, 258 N.W. 347 (1935).
169. Thoresen v. Grything, 264 Wis. 487, 492, 59 N.W.2d 682, 684 (1953); Liberty
Tea Co. v. LaSalle Fire Ins. Co., 206 Wis. 639, 643, 238 N.W. 399, 401 (1932); Jewell
v. Chicago, St. P. & M. Ry., 54 Wis. 610, 12 N.W. 83 (1882).
170. Carle v. Nelson, 145 Wis. 593, 597, 130 N.W. 467, 468 (1911).
171. Honore v. Ludwig, 211 Wis. 354, 356, 247 N.W. 335, 336 (1933); see text
accompanying notes 178, 179 & 180 infra.
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issuable fact, not the conclusion therefrom, should be inquired
about, for a conclusion does not disclose the factual basis un-
derlying the conclusion. However, one must remember that the
special verdict statute 2 specifically provides that the trial
court need not separately submit questions on the specific ways
in which a party was negligent.
B. A Double Question, Whether Phrased Conjunctively or
Disjunctively, Hazards Reversible Error.
Part I, section A above, emphasizes the "single, direct and
controverted ultimate fact" to which a question should be di-
rected. When a question is double, it must be phrased conjunc-
tively or disjunctively. If double or multiple, it is not possible
to determine compliance with the five-sixths verdict statute.,"
If inquiry is made about the negligence of the defendant, using
the conjunctive phrase "with respect to speed and lookout,"
and the jury answers "yes," there is no problem. But if the
jury's answer is "no," no analysis can be made by a reviewing
court to assure that the vote was not six negatives on speed and
six negatives on lookout with no recorded dissents because
every juror had voted "no" to part of the question. Therefore,
compliance with the five-sixths verdict statute is not assured.
Nevertheless' such conjunctive phraseology may be sustained
if the evidence would not sustain one aspect of the double
question. 4
When a double question is disjunctively phrased such as
"with respect to speed or lookout," and the jury answers "yes,"
the same problem is presented. 7 ' Because the error is one of
substance rather than form, the absence of objection to the
verdict form will not preclude an attack upon its validity. 7
Questions framed in the alternative or disjunctive also in-
vite uncertainty in the results. When it is necessary to inquire
about more than one specific issue, it is better to break up the
172. Wis. STAT. § 805.12(1) (1973).
173. Wis. STAT. § 805.09(2) (1973): "VERDICr. A verdict agreed to by five-sixths of
the jurors shall be the verdict of the jury. If more than one question must be answered
to arrive at a verdict on the same claim, the same five-sixths of the jurors must agree
on all the questions."
174. Petoskey v. Schmidt, 21 Wis. 2d 323, 124 N.W.2d 1 (1963); Geisinger v. Beyl,
80 Wis. 443, 50 N.W. 501 (1891).
175. Martin v. Ebert, 245 Wis. 341, 13 N.W.2d 907 (1945).
176. Vlasak v. Gifford, 248 Wis. 328, 21 N.W.2d 648 (1946).
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question with subdivisions.' 77 However, when the alternative or
disjunctive words are synonyms for the same physical phe-
nomenon ("flash or explosion") and are used interchangeably
to denominate a single event, and are so understood by the
jury, the question is not subject to condemnation. 7 1
C. When the Claim Is Grounded in Negligence, the Preferable
Special Verdict Question Is in Terms of Negligence.
Negligence is conduct that fails to meet a prescribed stan-
dard of ordinary care. When the conduct complained of is that
of a professional person (nurse, physician, surgeon, psychia-
trist, dentist, pharmacist, attorney, architect, engineer, ac-
countant) or a technician or member of a skilled occupation
(X-ray operator, optometrist, insurance agent, etc.) the stan-
dard of ordinary care is equated to a requisite standard of spe-
cial knowledge, care and skill for that profession or occupation.
Failure to meet the prescribed standard of care is negligent
conduct.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has extended great
latitude to trial courts in framing negligence special verdicts in
terms of whether the defendant performed medical or hospital
services according to a standard of "care and skill," the better
way is to frame the inquiry in terms of negligence because it
enables the jury to answer more easily the comparison question
which uses the term "negligence."
A medical malpractice case in Wisconsin is now grounded
in negligence and usually premised upon the failure to exercise
the required professional standard of care1 71 or a specific duty
to inform.'8 ° Although the court has approved a special verdict
inquiry framed to inquire with respect to "[failure] to exercise
that degree of care and skill which is exercised by the average
practitioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same
or similar circumstances,"' 8 such a formulation is not pre-
177. Geisinger v. Beyl, 80 Wis. 443, 50 N.W. 501 (1891); Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis.
222, 52 N.W. 88 (1892).
178. Bell v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 169 Wis. 408, 417, 172 N.W. 791,
795 (1919).
179. Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963), 25 Wis. 2d 645, 131
N.W.2d 314 (1964).
180. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975);
Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973).
181. Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 283-84, 206 N.W.2d 166, 172 (1973).
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ferred. In Carson v. City of Beloit' 2 the verdict was couched in
terms of negligence and received the court's approval. The
question may be phrased, "In rendering medical (and surgical)
services to the plaintiff, was the defendant negligent with re-
spect to exercising [the physician's standard of care]." In the
instance of an informed consent case, the question could be,
"In rendering medical (and surgical) services to the plaintiff,
was the defendant negligent with respect to reasonably disclos-
ing all significant facts under the circumstances of the situa-
tion necessary to form the basis of an intelligent and informed
consent of the plaintiff to the treatment (and operation)?"
Probably the question should be stated more simply: "In
rendering medical (and surgical) services to the plaintiff, was
the defendant negligent with respect to sufficient disclosure to
enable the plaintiff to make an informned consent to treat-
ment?" However, the informed consent doctrine is of recent
and evolving origin. A study of old cases demonstrates that as
the law achieves greater clarity, the special verdict questions
become more simple with the omission of standards from the
special verdict question, and reliance is placed solely upon the
jury instructions to acquaint the jury with the requisite stan-
dards; for example, "Did the defendant Dr. -, reasonably
and adequately inform the plaintiff -, to enable an intelli-
gent and informed consent by him to the treatment (and opera-
tion) in question?" Each of these forms leaves to the jury in-
structions the standard, i.e., duty to disclose "all significant
facts under the circumstances of the situation necessary" to
give informed consent.
If a medical negligence case involves both negligent treat-
ment and lack of informed consent, the question will be framed
only in negligence. The court should submit to the jury either
specific issues of negligent treatment and lack of informed con-
sent, or an ultimate fact negligence question with instructions
containing charges as to the specific issues.
The jury instructions relating to professional standards of
care18 3 would benefit from an addition which advises the jury
that a failure to exercise the described degree of care, skill and
judgment, constitutes negligence. In Carson the trial court may
have been concerned about the absence of a characterization
182. 32 Wis. 2d 282, 287, 145 N.W.2d 112, 114 (1966).
183. WIs. J.I.-CIVIL Nos. 1023, 1023.5 and 1023.7.
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of a breach of the standard of care, skill and judgment in the
patterned medical malpractice jury instruction'84 as negli-
gence, and supplemented the instruction with the Osborne v.
Montgomery'85 negligence definition found in Wisconsin Jury
Instruction-Civil Number 1005. The supreme court found the
definition of negligence unnecessary but not prejudicial.
In Wisconsin, safe place, dog owner, and products liability
cases present the same problem. A failure to comply with the
higher safe-place standard of care constitutes negligence. In
Krause v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 649816 it was recom-
mended that the verdict inquiry employ the word "negligent"
and suggested the following form: "At the time and place in
question [or at the time and place of Lora Krause's injury]
was the defendant negligent with respect to maintaining the
dance hall as safe as the nature of the place reasonably permit-
ted?"' 7
Although products liability cases in Wisconsin are grounded
in negligence' (unless express or implied warranty is the basis
of the claim), the formulation of the special verdict does not
lend itself to use of the word "negligence." Because section 402
A of the Second Restatement of Torts simplifies the method of
proof of liability, the ultimate facts that must co-exist are: (1)
a defective product, and (2) a product unreasonably dangerous
to a user or consumer when it left the possession of the seller.' 9
The suggested special verdict form accomplishes the transla-
tion of the "conduct" inquiry into negligence in the preface to
the comparative negligence question:
Question No. 5: If you have answered Questions 1 and 2
"yes," then such conduct on the part of the seller constitutes
negligence and requires, if you have also answered Questions
3 and 4 "yes," that you answer the following questions on
comparative negligence: Assuming the total negligence that
caused plaintiff's injuries to be 100%, what percentage
184. Wis. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1023.
185. 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
186. 9 Wis. 2d 547, 101 N.W.2d 645 (1960).
187. Id. at 554, 101 N.W.2d at 649.
188. That form of per se negligence grounded on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402 A (1965) will hereinafter be referred to as "402 A negligence."
189. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 3290. Other elements must be proven but the proof in
those areas will usually be uncontroverted. See comment to the verdict form.
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thereof do you attribute to: (a) the Product?"' (b) the
Plaintiff?
Although liability of a dog owner for a dog bite is grounded
in negligence, the effect of statutory liability is to eliminate the
need to prove scienter. 1 1 If liability is sought to be imposed
merely because the dog was mischievous, then the special ver-
dict question will not be framed in terms of negligence and will
require some translation to negligence in the instructions or a
prefatory statement to the comparative negligence questions.'92
However, if the liability is based upon the conduct of the dog
owner with respect to maintaining control and restraint of the
dog, then such translation is not required because the special
verdict question is easily framed in terms of negligence. 19 3
D. A Question Directed to Conduct of One of the Parties
Should Be Related in Time and Space to the Event Which Is
the Basis of the Litigation.
A broad definition of relevancy" 4 is appropriate to afford a
party a reasonable opportunity to prove his case. Certain evi-
dence, although relevant, may nevertheless not be close enough
to the mark nor in sufficient quantity to support a finding by
the trier of the fact. When formulating a special verdict ques-
tion, one should attempt to direct the jury's attention to the
concept of time and space to assure that it will focus upon
conduct probably related to the occurrence or event. An open-
ing phrase of the special verdict inquiry can achieve that goal
if it serves to reasonably focus upon conduct that approximates
an injury or event. The most frequent phraseology is "at and
just prior to" or "at and just before." This phrasing avoids
what may be overly broad, "at and before" or what may be too
190. Beware of this form of inquiry if more than one person's conduct contributed
to liability with or without issues of contribution between them. See Part I, sec. B
supra; City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866
(1973); and text accompanying notes 211 and 212 infra.
191. Wurtzler v. Miller, 31 Wis. 2d 310, 318, 143 N.W.2d 27, 30-31 (1966); Nelson
v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 119, 102 N.W.2d 251, 258 (1960). The Nelson case foresha-
dowed the comparable theory applied with respect to liability under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965) in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967).
192. See comment to Wis. J.I.-CnqL No. 1390.
193. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1391.
194. Wis. STAT. § 904.01 (1973).
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narrow, "immediately before." Another approved form is "at
the time and place."' 95
In the first instance, a properly formulated inquiry confines
the search of the evidence to a time relevant to the status of
the plaintiff. His status as a trespasser, licensee-invitee or fre-
quenter may be determinative of the standard of care owed to
him by the defendant. 95 Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc.'9 involved a
person injured in the collapse of a partly constructed building.
Terpstra had entered the premises as a trespasser and there-
after allegedly received permission to remain, thus converting
his status to a licensee. Special verdict questions which in-
quired with respect to his status as a trespasser, licensee or
invitee "on the day in question" and "at the time he came upon
the premises" should properly have inquired of his status "at
the time and place of his injury" in order that the pertinent
time and space could be considered. Similarly, a plaintiff who
seeks recovery under the safe-place statute ' must have his
status as a frequenter or trespasser related to the time of his
injury.
The context of the evidence and the theory of recovery al-
ways must be considered in determining the scope of time and
space appropriate to an injury. In Petoskey v. Schmidt'9' the
plaintiff's contention was not that the defendant had failed to
shovel snow at all, but that he had failed to continue to clear
a walk later in the evening after it had been indisputably
cleared earlier. In that instance the phraseology "at the time
and place of the injury to the plaintiff' was approved and a
requested "at and prior to the time of injury to the plaintiff"
was disapproved because "it would have permitted the jury to
have explored the conduct of the defendants for periods far in
advance of the time of the injury."2 '
A reverse circumstance was present in Behning v. Star Fire-
195. Krause v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 6498, 9 Wis. 2d 547, 101 N.W.2d 645
(1960).
196. Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975); Terpstra v.
Soiltest, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974); McNally v. Goodenough, 5 Wis.
2d 293, 92 N.W.2d 890 (1958).
197. 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).
198. Wis. STAT. § 101.11 (1973).
199. 21 Wis. 2d 323, 125 N.W.2d 1 (1963).
200. Id. at 329, 124 N.W.2d at 4-5. See also Stevens v. Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
268 Wis. 25, 66 N.W.2d 668 (1954).
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works Manufacturing Co.,210 because liability was predicated
upon a three-hour period of exclusive control by the defen-
dant's agent before the accident. The verdict question was
phrased "at and immediately prior to the time of the accident
in question." After the jury had found no negligence on the part
of the defendant, the trial court granted a new trial on liability,
expressing the view that the phraseology "at and immediately
prior to" was misleading to the jury. The supreme court
affirmed, stating:
The trial judge specifically pointed out the portion of the
verdict he felt to be misleading. It is apparent that he thought
the question placed inordinate focus on the events that had
occurred just prior to the occurrence of the misfire. Since the
res ipsa instruction given was based on plaintiff's contention
that defendant's agents had exclusive control of the explo-
sives for some three hours prior to the accident, the question
could have caused the jury to exclude a possible res ipsa
inference arising from the defendant's three-hour control of
the explosives."'
E. In a Personal Injury Case, When More than One Event or
Occurrence Is the Subject of Litigation, Care Must Be Exer-
cised in Phrasing the Negligence and Causation Questions with
Respect to "The Accident, " "The Collision, " "The Plaintiff's
Injury" or "The Defendant's Injury."
In a property damage case, in the typical slip, trip or fall
personal injury case, or in an automobile personal injury case
such as passenger against driver in a one-car accident, or driver
against driver in a two-car accident (with no seat belt contribu-
tory negligence or any other "passive" negligence), the fact is
seldom controverted that the injury resulted from the "acci-
dent" or "collision." The parties simply contest the claim of
negligence or the fact or extent of injury or property damage.
In that context, the use of the term "accident" or "collision"
in the negligence, causation and contribution questions is the
preferred inquiry because it serves to focus the jury's survey
and evaluation of the pertinent evidence upon the conduct
approximate to the basic event, the accident or collision.
When the evidence in a personal injury action presents the
201. 57 Wis. 2d 183, 203 N.W.2d 655 (1973).
202. Id. at 188-89, 203 N.W.2d at 659.
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dual prospects of active and passive negligence,2 3 or where the
parties and claims are multiple, the negligence, causation and
contribution questions should relate to the "injury" for which
recovery is sought.214 In some instances, further complication
results because the special verdict inquiries may resort to a
combination of reference to "injury," "accident," or "colli-
sion."
Use of the phrase "the accident" in verdict questions which
inquire as to causal negligence is apt to be misleading where
"the accident" embraces a series of near-misses or collisions for
which not all of the parties are causally negligent.2 5 An obvious
illustration is the chain collision where a considerable amount
of time elapses between impacts.2 0 Another illustration is a
situation in which injury is claimed due to a "second collision,"
i.e., the collision of an occupant with parts of the interior of the
automobile because of insufficient restraint or negligent design
of the vehicle. Reference to "the accident" can also cause error
in the damage liability instruction where injuries occur partly
in one collision and partly in another. 2 1
"Accident" or "collision" should not be the subject of the
negligence, causation or contribution questions where, from the
evidence, the event does not necessarily embrace the injury for
which the plaintiff seeks recovery. In Schrank v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co. 218 a child pedestrian claimed that the driver of the
striking automobile was negligent both as to lookout for not
seeing the pedestrian earlier, and as to management and con-
203. "Passive negligence" is negligence which in whole or part causes the injury for
which recovery is sought. It is distinguished from "active negligence" which causes the
event, that is, the accident or collision, from which injury in whole or part results. See,
e.g., Vroman v. Kempke, 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967); Theisen v. Milwaukee
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W.2d 140 (1962).
204. In Brown v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 148 Wis. 98, 138 N.W. 589
(1912), a causation question inquiring whether the plaintiff's negligence was a cause
of his "damages" was said to be faulty because the question should relate to his injury,
not damages. However, the court did not explain why the question was faulty. Possibly
it was because in the sequence of the questions, damages are not ascertained until after
negligence, causation and comparison are determined and thus it was unwise to have
the jury focus on any more than "injury" at that point. Some damages may flow from
an injury and some from an antecedent or subsequent event but that is best deter-
mined in answer to the damage question rather than creating an admixture of causa-
tion of damages and causation of injury.
205. See Bode v. Buchman, 68 Wis. 2d 276, 285, 228 N.W.2d 718, 723 (1975).
206. E.g., Johnson v. Heintz, 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973).
207. Id. at 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973), 73 Wis. 2d 286, 301, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
208. 50 Wis. 2d 247, 184 N.W.2d 127 (1971).
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trol for dragging the child 100 feet after impact. The negligence
question inquired generally with respect to the operation of the
motor vehicle. The causation question inquired with respect to
the cause of the "accident." The jury found negligence but also
found it not causal. The child's injury arguably was caused by
being dragged and the plaintiff contended that lookout caused
the "accident" but management and control caused the "in-
jury," and thus claimed that the cause question was impro-
perly phrased. Although clearly "injury" was the proper sub-
ject of the inquiry, error was averted because the trial court in
its instructions had admonished the jury to "consider the acci-
dent as including all the portions of the incident that resulted
in injury." ' 9 The special verdict questions directed to negli-
gence, causation and comparison should inquire about the
claimant's "injury" wherever the evidence places in issue
whether: (1) the claimant was in fact injured by reason of the
event; (2) an injury to the claimant existed prior to the event;
(3) a claimant's pre-existing injury was aggravated or acti-
vated; (4) the injury resulted from separate events for which
the defendants are not jointly liable; (5) multiple claims arose
from more than a single causal event; (6) the claim was caused
by active and passive negligence; or (7) injury symptomology
was so remote from the event that causation is substantially in
dispute. Preference in all cases for an "injury" inquiry is a
recommended precaution until it becomes apparent that "acci-
dent" or "collision" is an appropriate inquiry.
Indiscriminate choice between the ordinary alternatives
(accident, collision, injury) not only obscures the cause and
effect relationship between conduct and damages, it also leads
to an erroneous causal negligence comparison. Two one-car
accident cases provide illustrations.
In Theisen v. Milwaukee Automobile Mutual Insurance
Co. 210 the driver fell asleep at the wheel and left the road, caus-
ing the plaintiff passenger's injuries. Early in the evening, the
passenger and the driver participated in a performance of a
high school play followed by a party and a hayride that termi-
nated about 3:00 a.m. The accident occurred on the way home.
The plaintiff was asleeep or dozing. Other passengers testified
to the driver's conduct and the jury found him causally negli-
209. Id. at 260, 184 N.W.2d at 134.
210. 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W.2d 140 (1962).
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gent with respect to management and control. Plaintiff's al-
leged negligence related to entering and riding in the car and
lookout. She was found negligent in both respects, but only her
lookout negligence was found to be causal.
Both cause questions, one as to the driver's negligence, the
other as to the passenger's negligence, inquired whether the
negligence was a "cause of the accident and resulting injuries
to the plaintiff." Such an inquiry with respect to causal negli-
gence of the driver was appropriate because the evidence did
not dispute that his negligence caused both the accident and
the injury.21I The causation inquiry about the passenger was
erroneous because her negligence was passive, i.e., it only could
be a cause of her injuries, not a cause of the accident. The
causation inquiry with respect to the passenger should have
been limited to her "injury." Similarly, a claimant's contribu-
tory (seat-belt) negligence inquiry should relate to the claim-
ant's injury alone.212
There is no reason in the Theisen case why the inquiry with
respect to both the passenger's and the driver's negligence
could not have been directed solely to the passenger's injury.
Because the causation questions referred to "accident and in-
jury," the comparative negligence question would require the
same phraseology and would result in an improper comparison
of causal negligence.
The prospect of error in the formulation of the special ver-
dict questions decreases greatly when there is uniformity in the
nature of the inquiry (accident-collision-injury) in the ques-
tions dealing with negligence, causation and comparison. How-
ever, another one-car accident case demonstrates that uniform-
ity of phraseology will not invariably avoid error.
In Vroman v. Kempke 213 the car slid off a slippery road,
injuring two passengers. Driver negligence (in the operation of
the automobile) and passenger negligence (proceeding to travel
under the hazardous weather and road conditions) were
claimed. All of the questions were phrased in terms of injuries,
but the comparison question nevertheless provided the error by
asking the jury to apportion the negligence between the two
211. Note that the special verdict question connected the accident to the injuries,
while in Shrank v. Allstate Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 2d 247, 184 N.W.2d 127 (1971), the court's
instructions connected the accident to the injuries.
212. Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 383, 149 N.W.2d 626, 638 (1967).
213. 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967).
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passengers and the driver. Since each passenger's negligence
was passive it could only have contributed to her own injury
and not that of her fellow passenger. Two comparison questions
were required, each comparing the negligence of one passenger
with the driver's negligence. Most passenger negligence is pas-
sive and is causal only of the passenger's own injuries, although
in rare cases passenger negligence that interferes with the oper-
ation of a vehicle may be active negligence. The active-passive
negligence trap is most easily avoided by inquiring with refer-
ence to the plaintiff's injury.
A slip-trip-fall case will frequently involve evidence that
disputes whether a fall occurred, or more often, evidence that
the fall was unrelated to conduct of the defendant. Ambulation
lends itself to self-induced error and thus, whether the plaintiff
slipped, tripped or fell, irrespective of negligence on the part
of the defendant, is most often the focus of the case. Inquiry
with respect to the plaintiff's injury rather than the accident
seems to be a more sharply focused inquiry.
As the event from which the claims arose becomes more
complex, the prospect of error in the special verdict formula-
tion becomes more likely. An illustration is found in Wisconsin
Jury Instructions-Civil Number 1592,14 which suggests a ver-
dict form in an action in which three drivers and two guests are
claimants for personal injuries. Since the guests' negligence is
passive and the drivers' negligence is active, the comparison
questions are three in number. The first compares the drivers'
negligence (active) causing the "accident," the second and
third compare the driver negligence (active) to the negligence
(passive) of passengers One and Two, and relate to the "injury"
of the person inquired about. Use of the answers to the three
comparison questions enables the ultimate mathematical com-
putation by the court to apply the apportionment to the dam-
age award in compliance with the comparative negligence stat-
ute.2 5 The verdict form illustrated becomes more complicated
if the evidence establishes causal passive negligence on the part
of one or more of the drivers.
Special caution is required where the occurrence or event
inquired about (injury-accident-collision) is itself a controv-
214. The accompanying jury instructions are Wis. J.I.- CIVIL No. 1591, which
explain to the jury the active-passsive dichotomy.
215. See comment to WIs. J. I.-CIVIL No. 1591.
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erted fact. The defense may contend and offer evidence sup-
porting the contention that the claimant was not injured or
that the accident or collision did not occur. Injuries that over-
lay a pre-existing injury or condition, injuries supported only
by subjective complaints, the involvement of a "phantom car"
or near-miss, and noncontact accidents and collisions illustrate
the most frequent no-injury, no-accident, no-collision conten-
tions.16 If inquiry is made with respect to controverted occur-
rences, an assumption of a controverted fact is improperly
made.21 7 Probably the easiest and most effective way to solve
the problem is to add the phrase "if any" in the verdict ques-
tion after the injury-accident-collision reference.
When the question is phrased "at the time and place [of
the plaintiff's injury-accident-collision]" or "at and just before
[the plaintiff's injury-accident-collision]" a time, location 2 8
and event are established as a reference point for the jury's
judgment of conduct. Sometimes the evidence contests only
whether the challenged conduct was negligent, and not the
relationship of the challenged conduct to the time, location or
event. In such a circumstance, the phrase "at the time and
place in question" may sufficiently direct the jury's attention
to the reference point.
F. A Question Should Not Assume nor Imply a Controverted
Fact
A question assuming a controverted fact not established as
a matter of law, is faulty in form. 219 Such a question may be
understood by the jury as a determination or suggestion by the
trial judge. The most frequent error in this respect arises from
prefacing the category of negligent conduct inquired about with
the preposition "in." The following question illustrates:
Question 3. Immediately preceding, and at the time of the
accident involved here, was the defendant Charles Mueller
negligent in respect to:
216. In the writers' opinion, mere cross-examination of the claimant or his physi-
cian witness with respect to the existence of subjective symptoms or asking the investi-
gating traffic officer whether the claimant said at the scene that he was not hurt is
insufficient to elevate the existence of an injury to a controverted fact. (This of course
assumes that the physician continues in his opinion that the claimant was injured.)
217. See Part III, sec. F. infra.
218. Location is seldom disputed.
219. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wisconsin Iron & Wire Works, 145 Wis. 385, 129 N.W.
615 (1911).
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A. ....
B. In stopping on the highway in the place he did without
placing burning fusees or flares upon the road near his
standing truck?
C. In failing to have clearance lights burning upon the
truck?"'
By use of "In" the questions assume that Mueller did not
"bum" the warning or the clearance lights. Simple deletion of
"In" would have reduced the inquiries to appropriate catego-
ries of claimed negligence,' although the remaining phraseol-
ogy merits further refinements and improvements. 22
Where a question standing by itself might be construed to
assume a controverted fact, but in the context of the other
questions propounded in the special verdict it does not, no error
occurs.222 Also, a question which assumes a controverted fact is
not error if the jury instructions clearly direct the jury to rely
upon the evidence as they find it in making answer to the
question.224 In that fashion, it is made clear to the jury that they
are not to accept any assumption implicit in the question un-
less it is found by them from the evidence.
When descriptive phrases are used to modify the events or
conduct inquired about, an assumption of fact can arguably
occur. This question illustrates the problem: "Did the fire
which destroyed the plaintiff's property on the morning of De-
cember 5, 1930, result from a gas explosion which occurred
shortly preceding the fire?"' 2 5 The first italicized phrase as-
sumes the destruction of the plaintiff's property. If the evi-
dence had contested the extent of damage as distinguished
from the dollar value of damage, the question would have been
220. Foemell v. Mueller, 255 Wis. 277, 283-84, 38 N.W.2d 510, 513 (1949).
221. Id. at 284, 38 N.W.2d at 513. See also Odya v. Quade, 4 Wis. 2d 63, 90 N.W.2d
96 (1958); Hoffman v. Reinke, 268 Wis. 489, 67 N.W.2d 871 (1955); Para v. Douglas,
253 Wis. 311, 34 N.W.2d 229 (1948); Maas v. W. R. Arthur & Co., 239 Wis. 581, 2
N.W.2d 238 (1942).
222. A more simple phraseology could be: "At and just before the accident was the
defendant Charles Mueller negligent with respect to: (a) Burning fusees or flares? (b)
Lighted clearance lights?" The inquiries in subdivisions (a) and (b) could be further
simplified to: "(a) Fusees or flares? (b) Clearance lights?" An explanation of the
conduct required by the motor vehicle statutes is provided by the jury instructions.
223. Mayer v. Milwaukee St. Ry., 90 Wis. 522, 526, 63 N.W. 1048, 1049 (1895).
224. Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 37 Wis. 2d 610, 155 N.W.2d 619 (1968); Nechodomu v.
Lindstrom, 273 Wis. 313, 321, 77 N.W.2d 707 (1956).
225. E. L. Chester Co. v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 211 Wis. 158, 168-69, 247
N.W. 861, 865 (1933) (emphasis added).
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faulty. The second italicized phrase lends itself to the assump-
tion or inference that a gas explosion occurred. Whether the
explosion resulted from gas was a controverted fact. The phrase
was unnecessary. The question could have been worded: "Did
the December 5, 1930 fire at the plaintiff's property result from
a gas explosion?" If the second italicized phrase in the original
question was intended to describe the gas explosion as occur-
ring before the fire, the suggested question would retain the
intention by inquiring about the result. When the propriety of
the verdict form was reviewed by the supreme court, the objec-
tion was characterized as "trivial and insubstantial. ' 221 It is
apparent, however, that the court construed that question as a
special question of preliminary or additional fact, and believed
that the thrust of the litigation with respect to the cause of the
explosion was such that the jury was not led to assume a fact.
A new trial was granted on other grounds.
In the second trial in the more recent case of Fehrmann v.
Smirl, 2 27 a special verdict question was submitted in a form
suggested by the supreme court in its opinion in the first appeal
of the case. 2 18 The question read: "Was Oscar A. Fehrmann's
external sphincter injured in the course of the first operation
or the second operation or in the course of the treatment ad-
ministered between the two operations?" The defendant's
theory was that there was no sphincter damage, or if damaged,
the cause was disease. Defendant complained that the question
assumed sphicter damage, and therefore liability, and left to
the jury only an inconsequential determination of which surgi-
cal procedure or treatment caused the injury. The court upon
review held that the inquiry did not assume injury but "fairly
makes inquiry into a time interval during which the injury, if
any,229 may have occurred. '23 The court might have added that
in view of the jury's yes answer to the question, it was clear that
they did not read the question as assuming injury. Otherwise,
the answer would be an unintelligible response. Had the ques-
tion in the jury's mind assumed injury, an answer stating one
or more of the operations or treatment as the cause of the injury
226. Id. at 169, 247 N.W. at 865.
227. 25 Wis. 2d 645, 131 N.W.2d 314 (1964).
228. 20 Wis. 2d 1, 28, 121 N.W.2d 255, 122 N.W.2d 439 (1963).
229. The court's construction supplied the missing words. See text accompanying
note 217 supra, and Part III, sec. H infra.
230. 25 Wis. 2d 645, 650, 131 N.W.2d 314, 317 (1964).
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would have been required.
Although it is repeatedly suggested that a special verdict
question which assumes or implies facts which are disputed in
the evidence is improper,2 3' not often has such an assumption
or implication been found prejudicial.2 2 In most of the cases
either the evidence justifies the assumed fact because it is not
truly in dispute, or the assumption or implication is cured by
prefatory instructions to the special verdict questions or by
instructions which make no assumptions and prescribe the is-
sues of fact that must be found by the jury in answering the
question.2 3
Because negligence is shorthand for "failure for exercise
ordinary care," one quite naturally formulates the special ver-
dict question in the context of "failure," whether the inquiry
relates to common law or statutory duties. Thus, "failure to
sound horn," "failure to yield the right of way," "failing to stop
for a stop sign," "failing to signal a left turn," are frequently
employed. The weakness in these formulations is their suscep-
tibility to the charge that the question implies a view by the
trial court that the person inquired about was negligent in that
respect.
In two cases it has been suggested that where liability is
predicated upon a statutoy duty, the language of the statute
ought to be used in the special verdict question. Thus, "insuffi-
ciency or want of repairs" should be incorporated in the ques-
tion where liability against a municipality for a highway defect
is sought. 4 When liability of an automobile driver is premised
231. Froemmel v. Mueller, 255 Wis. 277, 38 N.W.2d 510 (1949); Maas v. W. R.
Arthur & Co., 239 Wis. 581, 2 N.W.2d 238 (1942).
232. In one "wrong side of the road" case, the court justified the erroneous question
on the ground that it had been posed in the special verdict with respect to both drivers.
Leonard v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411, 245 N.W. 849 (1933). "We go right enough,
darling, if we go wrong together," G. SANTAYANA, PERSONS AND PLACES: My HOST THE
WORLD 2 (1953).
233. Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 37 Wis. 2d 610, 155 N.W.2d 619 (1968); Fehrman v.
Smirl, 25 Wis. 2d 645, 131 N.W.2d 314 (1964); Sharp v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 268, 112 N.W.2d 597 (1961); Affett v. Milwaukee & Surbur-
ban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960); Huffman v. Reinke, 268
Wis. 489, 67 N.W.2d 871 (1955); Parr v. Douglas, 253 Wis. 311, 34 N.W.2d 229 (1948);
E. L. Chester Co. v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 211 Wis. 158, 247 N.W. 861 (1933);
Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392
(1932); Dolphin & Peacock Mining Co., 155 Wis. 439, 144 N.W. 1112 (1914); Mayer v.
Milwaukee St. Ry., 90 Wis. 522, 63 N.W. 1048 (1895).
234. Morley v. Reedsburg, 211 Wis. 504, 248 N.W. 431 (1933).
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upon a violation of a right-of-way statute, the inquiry should
refer to "yielding right of way, '235 or even more simply, "right
of way." Nevertheless, there has been a refusal to consider a
"failure" or "failing" phraseology as error per se.236 The view
has been that there is no error in the question phraseology
where the jury instructions contain an explication that it is the
duty of the jury to determine such an "assumed" or "implied"
issue.2
One should acquire a habit of phraseology that refers to
categories of negligence, e.g., "lookout," "right of way,"
"sounding horn," "manner of turning," "deviation of his motor
vehicle," "stopping." Using such phrases avoid assuming or
implying a controverted fact and eliminate the need to caution
the jury that they are to determine the issue. It also simplifies
the use of the pattern jury instructions without the need for a
preface to each instruction that fulfills the caution to the jury.
Instead, one can merely preface the instruction with "In
connection with Question 1, you are instructed that . ..."
Such a preface is required to relate the instruction to the appro-
priate question or questions.
G. Questions Should Avoid Duplicity.
Duplicity, as that term is used by the Supreme Court, means
the presence of two or more distinct findings in the verdict
where one or more of the findings is unwarranted. 8
Duplicity was more identifiably present when former sec-
tion 270.27 of the Wisconsin Statutes required separate inquir-
ies of specific issues of negligence, for example: "At and just
before the accident in question was the defendant negligent in
the operation of his motor vehicle with respect to: (a) Lookout?
(b) Management and control? (c) Speed?" In 1961, the statute
was amendedns to permit a general negligence inquiry, for ex-
ample: "At and just before the accident in question, was the
defendant negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle?" In
the latter instance the specific issues of negligence are pre-
235. Smith v. Superior & Duluth Transfer Co., 243 Wis. 292, 10 N.W.2d 153 (1943).
236. Kiggings v. Mackyol, 40 Wis. 2d 128, 161 N.W.2d 261 (1968).
237. Rensink v. Wallenfang, 8 Wis. 2d 206, 99 N.W.2d 196 (1959).
238. Doar & Doar, Avoiding Duplicity in Special Verdicts, 29 Wis. B. BULL. 13, 13
(Dec. 1956).
239. Supreme Court Order, 11 Wis. 2d v (effective June 1, 1961).
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sented to the jury solely through the specific negligence in-
structions incorporated in the jury charge.
The statutory amendment does not require a general sub-
mission; therefore, a "specific issue" submission is still permit-
ted. In instances where the trial court is uncertain whether the
evidence is sufficient to support an affirmative finding on one
of the issues of negligence presented or is uncertain whether as
a matter of law the conduct constitutes actionable negligence,
it may be desirable to submit a specific issues question to the
jury in order to ascertain its veiw of the specific issues. Thus,
duplicity, although not as pervasive as before 1961, continues
as a hazard to be avoided.
Miller v. Kujak4° provides a simple illustration of duplicity.
Whether the accident occurred on the concrete roadway or on
the shoulder was the central dispute. The special verdict ques-
tion asked:
[W]as. . .Miller negligent in the operation of his automo-
bile in any of the following respects:
(a) With respect to lookout?...
(b) With respect to management and control?...
(c) With respect to swerving to the left from the shoulder to
the concrete? 24'
The jury found causal negligence only with respect to manage-
ment and control, found the defendant negligent, and appor-
tioned negligence 75 percent to the defendant and 25 percent
to Miller.
Issues (b) and (c) are duplicitous because (c) is merely a
specific form of management and control and the evidence only
supported the specific form. The jury could not answer "yes"
to management and control and "no" to swerving because the
evidence could only support swerving. If the jury answered
"yes" to (b) and (c), then the answers would have been consis-
tent but there would be no support in the evidence for the
"management and control" finding except the "swerving" as-
pect. The vice of that circumstance is that the jury, in making
two such findings where only one was supported, might have
made a faulty comparison of negligence.
[Wlhere a special verdict permits the jury . . . to find the
operator of a motor vehicle causally negligent in several sepa-
240. 274 Wis. 370, 80 N.W.2d 459 (1957).
241. Id. at 372-73, 80 N.W.2d at 460.
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rate specified respects and the jury does so find, when ac-
tually the operator was causally negligent in only one of such
respects, there is a duplication of findings of negligence which
renders the comparison of negligence by the jury inaccur-
ate.24
2
The verdict comparison becomes suspect because the assump-
tion is made that the jury, having inaccurately found causal
negligence, must have given weight to the erroneous finding in
making the comparison of negligence, thus importing and com-
pounding the error. A new trial may be required because of the
current doctrine that the jury's comparison is unalterable. 21
Sometimes reference to the instructions will enable the
court to resolve a problem of potential duplicity in a special
verdict question. When the thrust of the instructions makes
clear that in answering specific issues of negligence, the jury is
not to duplicate the finding and is to consider the evidence in
a fashion that prevents overlap, the supreme court considers
the error in question formulation to be cured by the instruc-
tions,244 if, of course, there is evidence in the record to support
more than one finding.
Another error in the special verdict formulation of the
Miller case which inquired "with respect to swerving to the left
from the shoulder to the concrete" was that it did not permit
only one conclusion from a single direct answer by the jury. The
question was answered "no" by the jury, but one cannot as-
certain whether the jury meant "No, he did not swerve," or
"No, he was not negligent for swerving." Thus the answer was
a negative pregnant.245
As instructions may eliminate the potential for duplicity in
the special verdict question, so do they create a potential for
duplicity by instructing on an issue of negligence not capable
of support by the evidence. Duplicity in the instructions ought
to be avoided just as much as duplicity in the verdict. Never-
242. Dahl v. Harwood, 263 Wis. 1, 6, 56 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1953).
243. DeGroff v. Schmude, 71 Wis. 2d 554, 238 N.W.2d 730 (1976); Krauth v. Quinn,
69 Wis. 2d 280, 230 N.W.2d 839 (1975); Britton v. Hoyt, 63 Wis. 2d 688, 218 N.W.2d
274 (1974).
244. Zartner v. Scopp, 28 Wis. 2d 205, 137 N.W.2d 107 (1965).
245. The negative pregnant here is analogous to the negative pregnant in pleading
which "exists when the wording of a denial is such that, if taken literally, it does not
unequivocally deny the allegation but is pregnant with an admission ..... 2A
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.24 (2d ed. 1975) (footnote omitted).
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theless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is more tolerant of du-
plicity in instructions than in the verdict, and has refused to
extend the concept to instructions with this explanation:
We deem it inadvisable to extend the concept of duplicity to
the area of the instructions to the jury. One of the considera-
tions which prompted this court to amend sec. 270.27 Stats.,
in 1961 under its rule-making power, so as to permit questions
in a special verdict to be framed in terms of ultimate fact, was
that this would tend to eliminate duplicitous verdicts. Dupli-
citous verdicts which find overlapping elements of negligence
are bad because of their likely effect on the jury in answering
the comparative-negligence question. Where a single negli-
gence question framed in terms of ultimate fact is submitted,
we deem it unlikely that the jury will segregate particular
elements of negligence and assign to each element a certain
percentage in answering the comparative-negligence ques-
tion. Rather we think juries will tend to take an overall view
of the negligence of each participant in apportioning percen-
tage of fault. Therefore, even though a trial court instructs on
overlapping elements of negligence, this in itself does not
constitute error.2 46
Thus, when the special verdict question is an ultimate fact
form of submission, the court is unwilling to assume that the
unnecessary instruction affected the jury comparison of negli-
gence. Nevertheless it is error to instruct on an issue of negli-
gence that is unsupported by the evidence, but such error will
not result in reversal unless it is prejudicial.2 41 Where duplicity
of the instructions is the sole objection, the error is not prejudi-
cial. 21
In any event, it is not possible to ignore the prospect of
prejudice resulting from duplicity in ultimate fact verdict in-
structions. If specific issues of negligence were submitted in a
special verdict inquiry, the verdict and the instructions would
continue to be subject to attack under the concept of duplicity.
Only if the instructions for an ultimate fact special verdict are
prejudicial will the court reverse. "Prejudice" appears to em-
246. Merlino v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 571, 584, 127 N.W.2d 741, 748-49
(1964). See also Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union Prop. &
Cas. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 662, 667, 128 N.W.2d 12, 15 (1964).
247. Gilbert v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 2d 195, 206, 181 N.W.2d 527,
535 (1970).
248. Schueler v. Madison, 49 Wis. 2d 695, 715, 183 N.W.2d 116 (1971).
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brace the same concept as "duplicity," but when applied to the
ultimate fact negligence verdict the error must demonstrably
affect the comparison of negligence. This is so because the
Wisconsin Supreme Court will not assume an erroneous com-
parison as in the case of a duplicitous special verdict ques-
tion.249
Management and control as a negligence issue is a foical
point of duplicity because of its generic nature. When lookout,
speed and specific statutory traffic violations are instructed
upon together with management and control, the danger of
overlap between the specific categories of negligence and the
generic management and control presents an increased hazard
of duplicity.21 If, for example, a driver simply did not see until
too late to perform any evasive maneuver, only a lookout in-
struction should be requested. Frequently, a driver will protest
that he did not see until it was too late, but if there is contrary
evidence that he had time to take some evasive action, a man-
agement and control instruction may be included. Duplicity
will be prevented by the last paragraph of the management and
control instruction 2 ' which apprises the jury that management
and control is applicable only if the driver had time to evade.
When the sole issue of negligence presented by the evidence
is the rate of speed, a management and control instruction
should not be given.252 Management and control, insofar as it
embraces speed, relates to a reduction in speed.32 It should be
noted that the common law duty to sound a horn 254 is not con-
sidered duplicitous to management and control.2-'5
Specific statutory traffic violations should be instructed
upon separately 26 because they are not included within man-
agement and control.217 Such specific instructions will in most
situations eliminate the potential for prejudice (duplicity) but
249. Authorities cited supra note 246.
250. See text accompanying note 240 supra.
251. "If a driver does not see or become aware of danger in time for him to take
proper means to avoid the accident, he is not negligent as to management and control."
WIs. J.I.-CIIL No. 1105.
252. Roeske v. Schmitt, 266 Wis. 557, 64 N.W.2d 394 (1953); Schroeder v. Kuntz,
263 Wis. 590, 58 N.W.2d 445 (1952); Culver v. Webb, 244 Wis. 478, 12 N.W.2d 731
(1944).
253. Schroeder v. Kuntz, 263 Wis. 590, 58 N.W.2d 445 (1952).
254. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1096.
255. Cook v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 263 Wis. 56, 56 N.W.2d 494 (1953).
256. Burkhalter v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 268 Wis. 385, 68 N.W. 2d 2 (1955).
257. Thoreson v. Grything, 264 Wis. 487, 59 N.W.2d 682 (1955).
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one must be careful not to use one general instruction on turn-
ing, passing, deviation, parking or warnings if the evidence
postulates several possible violations.25
An objective view of the evidence rather than enthusiastic
advocacy serves a trial lawyer best in avoiding duplicity. Ea-
gerness to afford the jury many opportunities to find an oppo-
nent negligent leads to the excesses that result in duplicity.
Volition of the plaintiff in exposing himself to danger was
formerly a bar to recovery in a negligence case. The abolition
of the doctrine of assumption of risk in McConville v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'59 makes the voluntary
conduct of the plaintiff a matter of contributory negligence.
Thus negligence of the plaintiff is now the proper inquiry, not,
"Did [the plaintiff] willingly expose herself to the risk of in-
jury by entering and riding in the automobile. .. ?"I"
Similarly, Wisconsin's abolition of the doctrine of gross neg-
ligence2"' has made that inquiry and the parallel instruction
obsolete. Again, the matter is one of negligence and compari-
son.
H. The Jury Instructions May Be Considered in Determining
the Propriety of the Special Verdict Question
The trial court's exercise of discretion in formulating the
special verdict inquiry will not be upset upon appellate review
unless the question, taken with the applicable jury instruction,
does not fairly present the issue of fact to the jury.212 Although
enlargement of the scope of a question by the jury instruction
is permissible, 2 3 such latitude is not extended where the ques-
tion is narrow, restrictive and excludes the import of the in-
structions. 264
I. The Form of the Causation Question
In a negligence case, causation is a specific element that
258. Grana v. Summerford, 12 Wis. 2d 517, 107 N.W.2d 463 (1961).
259. 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962); see also Polsky v. Levine, 73 Wis. 2d
547, 243 N.W.2d 503 (1976).
260. Theisen v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 118 N.W.2d 140, 145
(1962).
261. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
262. Carson v. City of Beloit, 32 Wis. 282, 145 N.W.2d 112 (1966).
263. Murray v. Paine Lumber Co., 155 Wis. 409, 144 N.W. 982 (1914); Guse v.
Power & Mining Mach. Co., 151 Wis. 400, 139 N.W. 195 (1912) Jones v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 147 Wis. 427, 133 N.W. 636 (1911).
264. Kiggins v. Mackyol, 40 Wis. 2d 128, 161 N.W.2d 261 (1968).
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must be proven to establish the defendant's liability or effec-
tuate a diminished recovery under the comparative negligence
statute because of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Be-
cause the phrases "proximate cause" and "legal cause" are
largely obsolete and are discouraged because of the likelihood
of jury confusion by such ambiguous terms, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in 1952 adopted the substantial factor concept of
legal cause.2 16 The most usual form of the special verdict ques-
tion refers to "a cause" or "a substantial factor." The pattern
jury instruction favors "a cause. '2 6 The definition of "a cause"
in an instruction apprises the jury that there may be more than
one cause of an event and further advises that "it must appear
that the negligence under consideration was a substantial fac-
tor in producing" the event.67 Whether one inquires about neg-
ligence as causation for the "accident" or "collision" or "plain-
tiff's injury" or "defendant's injury,126  the question should
refer to "a cause," never "the cause," because the negligence
of several parties may jointly cause the event. To inquire about
"the cause" is to contradict the definition of causation. Note
in addition that causation inquiries should be in reference to
the injury-accident-collision, never to the plaintiff's or de-
fendant's "damages. 2 9
If the negligence question is divided into specific issues of
negligence rather than an ultimate fact submission, the causa-
265. Pfeiffer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29
(1952). See also Miles v. Ace Van Lines & Movers, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 538, 241 N.W.2d
186 (1976); Sampson v. Laskin, 66 Wis. 2d 318, 224 N.W.2d 594 (1975).
266. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1500.
267. The causation inquired about must nevertheless be a legal cause and not only
a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. The distinction was demonstrated in Perry
Creek Cranberry Corp. v. Hopkins Agricultural Chem. Co., 29 Wis. 2d 429, 139 N.W.2d
96 (1966), a case in which the plaintiff's cranberry crop failed following application of
the defendant's insecticide. The plaintiff's first cause of action was based upon viola-
tion of a state safety statute, the Wisconsin Economic Poisons Act, Wis. STAT. § 94.676
(1961). The defendant's mislabeling of the insecticide was held to be a violation of the
statute and hence constituted negligence per se. The jury further found that it was the
defendant's product which caused the destruction of the plaintiff's crop. In a misrepre-
sentation action, however, the causal connection between wrongful conduct and result-
ing damage lies in the inducement of the plaintiff to act to his detriment. See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 714 et seq. (4th ed. 1971). A special verdict
question directed to this issue was held to be unnecessary in view of the defendant's
failure to controvert the allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff had relied on the
misbranding.
268. See Part III, sec. E supra.
269. See note 204 supra.
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tion question must also be subdivided to inquire specifically
about cause. Failure to do so is error.?70
J. The Form of the Comparative Negligence Question.
The substance of the comparative negligence question is:
Taking the combined negligence which caused the injury27' to
the plaintiff John Smith as 100 percent, what percentage of
such negligence is attributable to:
(a) the defendant James Jones? Answer __ %
(b) the plaintiff John Smith? Answer %
Total: 100%
Insertion of "Total: 100%" is designed to remind the jury that
the sum of the negligence apportioned must be that amount.
Frequently, simple arithmetical errors by the jury require
rejection of the verdict and a direction to retire to further delib-
erations.272 By inserting the total, the prospect of jury arithmet-
ical error is reduced.
A simpler form of substance is:
What percentage of all the causal negligence which caused
the injury to the plaintiff John Smith do you attribute to:
(a) the defendant Frank Jones? Answer %
(b) the plaintiff John Smith? Answer __ %
Total: 100%
The writers prefer the longer form because it has the effect of
twice telling the jury that the causal negligence must total
100%.
When multiple claims and parties involve active and pas-
sive negligence as earlier discussed 2 3 more than one compari-
son question is required. By submission of one comparison
question inquiring about the negligence causal of "the
accident-collision" and the necessary additional comparison
questions inquiring about the negligence causal of the "injury"
to each of the persons who are passively negligent, the proper
comparisons of causal negligence are obtained and the award
270. Reserve Supply Co. v. Viner, 9 Wis. 2d 530, 101 N.W.2d 663 (1960); Fontaine
v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410 (1931).
271. The phraseology is fraught with the same occurrence or event reference (in-
jury-accident-collision) discussed in connection with the formulation of the negli-
gence and causation questions. See Part III, sec. E supra.
272. See Part VII infra.
273. See text accompanying notes 212-215 supra.
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of judgment is merely a mathematical computation. 27 14
Only causal negligence is to be compared.21 5 To avoid jury
error in that regard, the comparative negligence question
should contain a prefatory instruction 27 directing the jury to
answer the comparative negligence question only if it has an-
swered two or more cause questions, specified by number. Un-
less two or more cause questions are answered, there is no need
to compare the negligence of the parties. In its entirety the
comparison question could then read:
If you have answered Questions 2 and 4 "yes", then and only
then answer this question: Taking the combined negligence
which caused the injury to the plaintiff John Smith as 100%,
what percentage of such negligence is attributable to:
(a) the defendant James Jones? Answer __%
(b) the plaintiff John Smith? Answer _%
Total: 100%
The prefatory instruction avoids inconsistency in the verdict by
directing the jury to make a comparison only if two or more
parties are causally negligent.
One should note that the above forms of the comparative
negligence question are appropriate only if the ultimate fact
form of negligence submission is made. If the negligence ques-
tion is broken down into a specific issue form the cause
question must be in comparable form. This form is suggested:
If you have answered any subdivision of Question 2 "yes" and
if you have answered any subdivision of Question 4 "yes",
then and only then answer this question: Taking the com-
bined negligence which caused the injury to the plaintiff John
Smith as 100%, what percentage of such negligence is attrib-
utable to:
(a) the defendant James Jones? Answer ____%
(b) the plaintiff John Smith? Answer __%
Total: 100%
Another form contains a more explicit prefatory instruction
regarding the need to find negligence and causation of two or
more parties, but is unwieldy and handicapped by complexity:
274. WiS. J.I.-CVIL No. 1592 and comment.
275. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934)
(comparative negligence statute so construed).
276. See Part IV, sec. B infra.
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If you find by your answers to any subdivisions of Questions
No. 1 and 3 that both the defendant James Jones and the
plaintiff John Smith were negligent, and if you further find
by your answers to any subdivisions of Questions No. 2 and
4, that the negligence of each was a cause of the injury to the
plaintiff John Smith, then and only then answer this ques-
tion: Taking the combined negligence which caused the in-
jury to the plaintiff John Smith as 100%, what percentage of
such negligence is attributable to:
(a) the defendant James Jones? Answer __%
(b) the plaintiff John Smith? Answer __%
Total: 100%
In a products liability case involving multiple defendants,
although all are liable to the plaintiff as a matter of law as
assembler, part manufacturer and distributor of the defective
article,'77 the special verdict is incomplete without a compari-
son question to resolve the issues of contribution between the
defendants. 7 The negligence, causation and comparison of all
parties whose conduct contributed to the occurrence or event
litigated (injury-accident-collision) must be inquired about in
the verdict.
IV. THE MECHANICS OF SPECIAL VERDICT PREPARATION
A. Provision Must Be Made for Dissenting Jurors.
Historically, the special verdict form usually incorporated
a provision for two dissenting jurors on typed lines following
each verdict question. That practice was thought by many trial
judges to invite dissent and discourage jurors from their duty
to deliberate for the purpose of achieving at least five-sixths
agreement if possible .2  A special verdict was therefore de-
vised, containing but two typed lines for dissenting jurors at
the foot of the verdict with additional blank space below the
two lines. The additional blank space was necessary to avoid
the prospect that the verdict form coerced the jurors to five-
sixths agreement by denying more than two jurors the space to
277. Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
278. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866
(1973). If contribution issues are not present, one must nevertheless inquire about all
parties whose conduct constitutes negligence. See Part I, sec. B supra.
279. See Part I, sec. A supra.
280. In a civil case a 5/6 verdict is permitted. Wis. STAT. § 805.09 (1973).
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add their names. The latter practice was challenged in
Kowalke v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,21
where the court discussed both special verdict dissent forms:
It seems to us that both methods furnish adequate opportun-
ity for expression of dissent, and that they afford clear indica-
tion to dissenting jurors as to where they are to place their
names. Since there is no statutory authority or rule of this
court prohibiting the method as employed in this instance, it
cannot be held that it was error to use such method. Nor can
we find prejudice with reference to the claimed error respect-
ing the provision of but two lines for names of dissenting
jurors. It is recommended, however, that when but two lines
and additional space is provided, the court in its instructions
advise the jurors that dissenters may place their names on the
lines or in the additional space. The instructions in the in-
stant matter in nowise limited the number of jurors who were
privileged to dissent, and it is assumed, that had there been
more than two jurors who wished to do so, they would have
utilized the space below the lines provided, in the event that
the lines had already been filled. We find no error .... S2
Wisconsin Jury Instructions-Civil Number 180 contains the
suggested direction to the jury that the space below the blank
lines may be used by dissenting jurors. It is important that the
blank spaces below the lines for dissenting jurors be at least
several inches in order to avoid a challenge to the verdict form
as coercing the agreement of ten jurors or denying the oppor-
tunity to dissent to more than two jurors. Each of the methods
of providing for dissents is proper and the discretion rests with
the trial court.2 3 Most trial judges seem to prefer the form with
dissents at the foot of the verdict.
Because the jury of twelve may be reduced to any number
less than twelve by stipulation of the parties.2 4 A seven-to-
twelve person jury special verdict form must provide at least
two lines and some additional space for dissenting jurors if
there be any. One line and additional space must be provided
for a jury of six or less.
281. 3 Wis. 2d 389, 88 N.W.2d 747 (1958).
282. Id. at 403, 88 N.W.2d at 754-55.
283. Krueger v. Winters, 37 Wis. 2d 204, 213, 155 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1967).
284. Wis. STAT. § 805.09 (1973).
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
B. Prefatory Instructions to Special Verdict Questions
Should Be Included
A preface to a special verdict question instructing the jury
not to answer the question unless it has answered a prior ques-
tion in a particular fashion, does not violate the rule against
informing the jury of the effect of its answers.8 5 A carefully
framed preface to a question can help the jury avoid inconsis-
tency in its verdict. One such error by a jury is the inconsis-
tency of a finding of no negligence on one party, or negligence
but no causation, followed by a comparative negligence answer
that assesses a percentage of causal negligence to the excul-
pated party. Early cases supplied a simple solution. A question
that was improperly answered because the preface had been
disregarded by the jury, was held to be not in fact submitted
to the jury because the conditions in the preface had not been
fulfilled. Thus, the Wisconsin court held in McGeehan v. Garr,
Scott & Co.,286 that the erroneously answered question was
properly disregarded by the trial court in entering judgment.
A variation of the same rule was developed in Parmentier v.
McGinnis,87 where the jury awarded no damages for an alleged
wrongful death, and the jury found by answers to prior ques-
tions that the death was not wrongful. The failure to answer the
damage question was disregarded.2 8 Both rules were applied in
Goelz v. Knoblauch211 but in Bodden v. John H. Detter Coffee
Co. 290 the McGeehan case was not followed. The Bodden case
did not disregard the later answer because it was contrary to
an earlier answer, but changed the earlier answer because the
plaintiff was causally negligent as a matter of law, and permit-
ted the later answer to stand as the appropriate comparison.
In Forbes v. Forbes29' the McGeehan rule was applied to a
verdict which assessed twenty percent of the causal negligence
to the plaintiff although by a prior answer to a verdict question
the jury had found the plaintiff free from negligence.
285. Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Wis. 233, 238, 35 N.W.2d 920, 923 (1949);
Chopin v. Badger Paper Co., 83 Wis. 192, 198, 53 N.W. 452, 454 (1892).
286. 122 Wis. 630, 634, 100 N.W. 1072, 1074 (1904).
287. 157 Wis. 596, 600, 147 N.W. 1007, 1008 (1914); see also Wagner v. Peiffer, 259
Wis. 566, 579, 49 N.W.2d 739, 746 (1951).
288. See Part V, sec. A infra.
289. 242 Wis. 186, 7 N.W.2d 420 (1943).
290. 218 Wis. 451, 261 N.W. 209 (1935).
291. 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112 (1938).
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Partial reversal of the McGeehan rule first appeared in
Mahoney v. Thill,29 2 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court for
the first time expressed doubt about permitting an improperly
arrived at comparison to stand after the jury's answer to a
negligence question was changed by the court as a matter of
law:
With that finding set aside, then and not until then did occa-
sion exist for a comparison of negligence. Under the rule the
jury legally left the verdict in such a state that the finding
on comparison amounted to nothing, and that condition as
it related to the comparison question cannot now be changed.
When the court directed the finding of negligence on respon-
dent's part, a different set of facts was presented. But the jury
was no longer at hand and a ruling by the court that gave
vigor to a lifeless finding would result in the trial of that
question by the court without a jury. As a practical matter,
who can say what the answer to the comparison question
would have been had the jury been advised of the existence
of causal negligence on respondent's part. In this state of the
case we cannot consider that the jury passed upon the facts
and made-findings warranting judgment.293
Although the Goelz case followed the Mahoney case by several
months, Goelz did not involve contributory negligence by the
plaintiff and a comparison was not required.
Mitchell v. Williams294 and Wojan v. 1g1295 followed and ap-
plied without citation the doctrine expressed in Mahoney. The
reckoning for the sub silento overrulings arrived in Statz v.
Poh 296 where the court frankly acknowledged its inability to
reconcile the earlier decisions. The court held to the new rule
that it had developed and restated it:
(1) If the issue of causal negligence is for the jury and the
party inquired about is exonerated but the jury in its compar-
ison of negligence erroneously attributes to such party some
degree of causal negligence, the verdict is inconsistent, and a
new trial must be granted;
(2) If it be determined that the party inquired about is free
from causal negligence as a matter of law and the jury has
292. 241 Wis. 359, 6 N.W.2d 239 (1942).
293. Id. at 362, 6 N.W.2d at 240.
294. 258 Wis. 351, 46 N.W.2d 325 (1951).
295. 259 Wis. 511, 49 N.W.2d 420 (1951).
296. 266 Wis. 23, 62 N.W.2d 556 (1954).
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exonerated him but has also attributed to him some degree
of causal negligence, then the court should strike the answer
to the question on comparison as surplusage and grant judg-
ment accordingly;
(3) If but one element of negligence is submitted to the jury
and the court can find as a matter of law that the party
inquired about in the question is guilty of causal negligence
and the jury finds that he is not, and in answer to the ques-
tion on comparative negligence attributes to him some degree
of causal negligence, the court should change the answer to
the question which inquires as to his conduct from "No" to
"Yes" and permit the jury's comparison to stand with judg-
ment accordingly."7
It appears reasonable to assume that the adoption of the
comparative negligence statute and the inviolability of the
jury's comparison were the basis for the rule change. However,
the McGeehan rule has not been entirely abandoned. If no
comparison question is involved, the McGeehan rule permits
the trial court to disregard an improperly answered question as
never submitted to the jury.
Recently in the review of the retrial of Johnson v. Heintz298
the supreme court considered an inconsistent verdict that at-
tributed negligence causal to the plaintiffs injury to the driver
of the second-impact car. However, the jury failed to answer a
damage question that inquired with respect to the extent of
damage attributable to the second impact. The court acknowl-
edged that it could not determine which finding was surplusage
or immaterial, but noted that the most favorable finding in the
view of the appealing defendant was that no injury had been
sustained in the second impact. Because the appealing defen-
dant was the insurer of the driver in the first impact, its liabil-
ity was unchanged and unaffected. The court further noted
that the rule of Statz v. Poh1299 had been amended to permit a
plaintiff to accept judgment where the inconsistencies were
resolved against him:
On the state of the record, a ruling could not be made either
way. The rule of Statz that fatally inconsistent verdicts
require retrial has been modified, however, in Erdmann v.
297. Id. at 29, 32a, 62 N.W.2d at 559, 63 N.W.2d at 712. See also Hillstead v. Shaw,
34 Wis. 2d 643, 150 N.W.2d 313 (1967).
298. 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
299. 266 Wis. 23, 62 N.W.2d 556 (1954).
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Wolfe (1960), 9 Wis.2d 307, 101 N.W.2d 44. See also:
Jahnke v. Smith (1973), 56 Wis. 2d 642, 203 N.W.2d 67.
Erdmann held that the plaintiff may'accept a judgment
which is supported by a verdict in which the inconsistencies
are resolved against him. Thus in this case, the verdict would
be read, as acceptable to the plaintiff, that definite injuries
had been proven to a reasonable degree of certainty as having
been caused in only the first collision and that no compensa-
ble injury had been proven as resulting from the second im-
pact. The evidence in the record supports this result.',
The upshot of the case was that the verdict although uncorrect-
ably inconsistent, nevertheless provided no economic benefit to
the appealing defendant who was liable irrespective of the in-
consistencies resolved in his favor. The judgment was therefore
affirmed."'
An interesting application of a prefatory instruction is
found in a special verdict involving multiple comparison ques-
tions:
1592 Comparative Negligence: Recommended Questions,
Multiple Driver-Multiple Guest Comparison
Question 11:
If you answered "Yes" to only one of Questions 2, 4, and
6, you will then insert the figure 100 in the blank space in
Question 11 which follows the name of the driver set forth in
that one of Questions 2, 4, and 6, which you have answered
"yes."
If you have answered two or all three of Questions 2, 4, and
6 "Yes," thereby finding that such two or all three of the
drivers named in such questions were negligent and that the
respective negligence of each of such drivers was a cause of
the accident of (date), then answer this:
What percentage of all the causal negligence involved
which produced the accident of (date) do you attribute to:
(a) Driver (A) (If you did not answer Question 2, or
answered such question "No," insert zero) _ %
(b) Driver (B) (If you did not answer Question 4, or
answered such question "No," insert zero) 1%
(c) Driver (C) (If you did not answer Question 6, or
answered such question "No," insert zero) -%
100%
300. Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 308, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
301. Bush v. Maxwell, 79 Wis. 114, 48 N.W. 250 (1891).
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Question 12:
If you answer "Yes" to one or more of Questions 2, 4, and
6, and also have answered "Yes" to Question 8, thereby find-
ing that one or more of the drivers, (A), (B), and (C) was
negligent, that the guest (X) also was negligent, and that the
negligence of such driver or drivers and of (X) was a cause of
the injuries sustained by (X), then answer this:
What percentage of all the causal negligence involved in
the accident of (date) which produced the injuries to (X) do
you attribute to:
(a) The combined causal negligence of Driver (A),
Driver (B), and Driver (C)
(b) The causal negligence of Guest (X)
Question 13:
Question 13 is identical with Question 12, except the
Guest (Y) is substituted for Guest (X).12°
In order to avoid inconsistency of a comparison finding with a
causal negligence finding, the jury is instructed to insert "zero"
in answer to a comparison inquiry with respect to one party if
it answered "no" to the cause question with respect to that
party. The cause question itself contains a prefatory instruc-
tion that it should not be answered unless the negligence ques-
tion with respect to that party has been answered "yes." Fur-
ther, the comparison question bears the usual caution"3 that it
should not be answered unless the jury has answered "yes" to
at least two cause questions. To preclude any doubt in the
matter there is, in addition to the cautionary jury instructions
on comparative negligence, a general instruction cautioning
the jury to read and follow the prefatory instructions to all
special verdict questions."'
Another interesting prefatory instruction is found in the
comparison question in a products liability case. 5 It enables
the Wisconsin jury to make the transition from strict liability
under section 402 A of the Second Restatement of Torts to
negligence for the purpose of comparison.3 6
302. WIS. J.I.-CIVIL No. 1592.
303. Id. See also Wis. J.I.-CIVIL Nos. 1575, 1585, 1590, 1591.
304. Wis. J.I.-Civn. No. 145.
305. Wis. J.I.-CIVIL No. 3290.
306. See Part Ill, sec. F supra.
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V. DAMAGE QUESTIONS
A. Damage Questions Should Always Be Included In The
Verdict If In Issue And The Trial Court Should Insist That The
Jury Answer The Damage Questions.
The function of the special verdict is to procure from the
jury its findings on controverted facts. Damage and the amount
thereof is one of such findings unless agreed to by the parties
or answered by the court as a matter of law. Usually only items
of special damage are agreed to or capable of being answered
by the trial court as a matter of law and thus a damage ques-
tion is almost always required.
"It is better practice for the trial court to insist that the jury
answer the question as to damages. ' 37 The pattern Wisconsin
jury instruction instructs the jury that it must answer the dam-
age question no matter how it has answered any other question
in the special verdict.0 8 By requiring an answer to the damage
question, the trial court on motions after verdict, and the ap-
pellate court on review, are more likely to be able to make a
final disposition of the case. Either court may be able to alter
nonliability findings and apply the jury's damage finding in the
event liability questions are improperly answered by the jury.
Therefore, damage questions should lack prefatory instructions
to answer the question only in the event other questions dealing
with liability have been answered in a certain fashion. In addi-
tion, such prefatory instructions are likely to inform the jury
of the effect of their answers to liability questions contrary to
a major goal of a special verdict. In Wisconsin the sole purpose
of a special verdict is to obtain the jury's findings regardless of
the effect of the answer upon a party's right to recover,3 9 and
it is reversible error to inform the jury of the effect of its an-
swers.310 If, however, the jury has not answered the damage
question, or has answered it "none" or "not any" and has exon-
erated the defendant of liability, the neglect of the trial court
to require the jury to make a dollar award is not reversible
error.
3 1
'
307. Prings v. Donovan, 266 Wis. 277, 281, 63 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1954).
308. WIs. J.I.-CIoL No. 1700(b).
309. Anderson v. Seelow, 224 Wis. 230, 234, 271 N.W. 844, 846 (1937).
310. Kobelinski v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 504, 520, 202
N.W.2d 415, 425 (1972).
311. Frings v. Donovan, 266 Wis. 277, 281, 63 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1954); Goelz v.
Knoblauch, 242 Wis. 186, 7 N.W.2d 420 (1943); Parmentier v. McGinnis, 157 Wis. 596,
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In an eminent domain case where the verdict questions re-
lating to damages require the jury to determine the before and
after value of the property, the instructions may not advise the
jury that the difference between the two figures constitutes the
plaintiff's damages. 2 Neither the special verdict, the jury in-
structions nor the comments of counsel with reference to liabil-
ity or damages may inform the jury of the effect of its answers.
B. Submitting A Damage Question Does Not Assume Nor
Imply The Existence Of Damage.
As discussed above, it is possible for a special verdict ques-
tion to be framed in such a manner as to imply an answer or
assume a controverted fact.3 3 Failure to append the phrase "if
any" to the injury-accident-collision reference in a liability
question may constitute the assumption of a controverted fact
when the fact of injury or accident or collision is truly dis-
puted.3 14 Nevertheless, incorporation of a damage question in
a special verdict does not imply or suggest an award of dam-
ages, even though the fact of injury or actual damage resulting
therefrom is controverted. This is so because the damage ques-
tion can be answered directly or negatively with "zero" or
"0."'3 - Accordingly, it is unnecessary. to incorporate the phrase
"if any" in the damage question. However, an additional safe-
guard is provided by accompanying the damage question with
a special instruction 316 with regard to the burden of proving
damages.
Although the phrase "if any" in the damage question is
unnecessary, it is not necessarily error to include it in the ques-
tion or the instructions if the fact of any injury at all is in
147 N.W. 1007 (1914). See also Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 306, 243 N.W.2d
815 (1976).
312. Zombkowski v. Wisconsin River Power Co., 267 Wis. 77, 81, 64 N.W.2d 236,
239 (1954). In this case the court seems to have exalted form over substance. The
"special" verdict questions all deal with items of damage and do not involve liability.
Thus the verdict was no more than a general verdict with special interrogatories.
McDougall v. Ashland Sulphite-Fibre Co., 97 Wis. 382, 73 N.W. 327 (1897). All of the
cases cited by appellant's brief which admonish the court not to permit the jury to
know the effect of their answers deal with "true" special verdicts containing questions
of liability and damages.
313. See Part El, sec. F supra.
314. See text accompanying note 217 surpa, and Bredlau v. York, 115 Wis. 554, 92
N.W. 261 (1902).
315. See Plummer v. Leonhard, 44 Wis. 2d 686, 695, 172 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1969).
316. WIs. J.I.-CIWL No. 1705.
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dispute."7 In most personal injury trials some injury is undis-
puted but the extent of the injury is contested. To use the
phrase "if any" in either the damage special verdict question
or the damage instructions is very risky and only a study of the
context of its use will enable one to avoid the prospect of preju-
dice.
If the special verdict question is itemized as to special and
general damages, the phrase "if any" should not be incorpo-
rated in subdivisions of the question because it may be become
unclear whether the jury overlapped an award in another sec-
tion of the question and thus made a double damage award.3' s
If the phrase "if any" is incorporated in a general damage
question, an error occurs where the evidence is undisputed as
to some slight injury, although in a case where a substantial
award was made the court held that its use was not prejudi-
cial."9 If the phrase has any utility at all, it should be incorpo-
rated in the body of the question: "What sum of money, if any,
will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff with respect
to: (a), (b), (c), etc?"
A form of the damage question in vogue some years ago, "If
the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of money will
fairly and reasonably compensate him with respect to: (a), (b),
(c), etc?" seems to be far more appropriate if there is a chal-
lenge to any or all of the claimed injuries and the damage
resulting therefrom.321 If the question is framed in that fashion,
an alteration to the introductory paragraph of the appropriate
general compensatory damage pattern instructions32' and some
of the special damage instructions will be necessary.32
317. In a suit against a union for legal fees where the defense contended that certain
persons had no authority to contract for the union, a damage question that inquired
about the value of legal services "he rendered" to the union assumed a fact in issue.
Sigman v. General Drivers Local 563, 5 Wis. 2d 6, 92 N.W.2d 219 (1958).
318. Kalish v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 268 Wis. 492, 497, 67 N.W.2d
868, 870-71 (1955).
319. Cohen v. Bridges, 255 Wis. 535, 39 N.W.2d 373 (1949).
320. Braun v. Minneapolis, St.P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 170 Wis. 10, 172 N.W. 743
(1919); Bredlau v. York, 115 Wis. 554, 92 N.W. 261 (1902). Although the pattern
Wisconsin jury instructions advise the jury indirectly that they are not deciding the
case nor making an award of damages (WIs. J.I.-CrML Nos. 100, 1700, 1705, 1750),
the authors have substantial doubt that juries are truly aware from the instructions of
the difference between determining the amount of damage (i.e., "pricing the claim")
and awarding damages. A special verdict determines the fact of damage in terms of
dollars; only a general verdict awards damages as the end result of the application of
the law to the facts.
321. WIs. J.I.-CIIL Nos. 1750, 1753, 1754, 1755.
322. WIs. J.I.-CIVIL Nos. 1765, 1803, 1804, 1805, 1810, 1825, 1830, 1840, 1845.
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C. A Special Fact Causation Question Directed To Whether
The Claimed Damages Arose From The Occurrence Or Event
Litigated May Be Appropriate.
We have discussed the problem of framing the damage
question to avoid assuming or implying the existence of dam-
age. An addition to the alternative choices in formulating the
damage question is the use of a special question of fact where
it will be helpful to determine whether the claimed damages
arose from an occurrence for which the defendant has liability.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has approved such a practice
and rejected the contention that it is improper cross-
examination of the jury:
The basis for his objections to this question is that it consti-
tutes an improper cross-examination of the jury. Neverthe-
less, the issue of whether the accident of March 16, 1959,
caused the amputation of plaintiff's leg was in no sense evi-
dentiary but rather one of ultimate fact. Aside from the ques-
tions of negligence, it was the single critical issue in the case.
All of the medical expert opinion evidence was directed to it.
In such a situation it was proper for such a question to be
included in the special verdict.23
Although the jury is required to answer the damage question
only in terms of damages that are reasonably contemplated or
the natural and probable result of the occurrence litigated,324
one must not overlook the fact that the evidence may establish
an "aggravation" of a preexisting disease or condition for which
the defendant has liability. 325 Thus the special causation ques-
tion should be framed in terms of "a cause," not the natural
and probable result of his injuries-accident-collision, 326 to
avoid the prospect that the causation of the damages in the
inquiry is too restrictive.
D. The Damage Inquiry Can Be Formulated In A General
Question Of Damages Or In An Itemized Question Of General
And Special Damages.
Whether the damage question should inquire as to one lump
323. Chapnitsky v. McClone, 20 Wis. 2d 453, 463, 122 N.W.2d 400, 405-06 (1963).
The use of a cause question with respect to damages was not approved for "mine-run"
personal injury actions.
324. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1705; see also Wis. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1750.
325. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL Nos. 1710, 1715, 1720.
326. Crouse v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 104 Wis. 473, 483, 80 N.W. 752, 755 (1899).
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sum or whether it should be subdivided in inquiries with re-
spect to special and general damages is left to the trial court
where the damages are unliquidated.3 27 The submissions are
explicated in the Wisconsin pattern jury instructions28
The writers favor subdivided damage questions because
they provide greater insight into the jury's findings and be-
cause of that insight, greater opportunity to the trial court to
correct jury error without retrial. 2 By subdividing the damage
question, the jury is compelled to weigh the evidence and re-
spond specifically to such contested damage issues as perma-
nency of injury, future loss of earning capacity, future medical,
hospital and nursing expenses, the extent of the personal injury
damages to date as well as medical, hospital, nursing expenses
to date and loss of earning capacity to date. With subdivision
of the damage question, just how the jury weighed the evidence
with respect to the subsidiary damage issues may be apparent.
A lump sum submission tends to obscure rather than clarify
the end result."'
In speciflying items of damage, one must be careful to limit
itemized inquiries to matters of damage that are recoverable in
their entirety as separate entities. For instance, in an eminent
domain action the "fair market value" of the property taken
may be arrived at by expert witnesses who engage in arithmeti-
cal calculations of the value of land and improvements or sev-
eral parcels of assembled land or several improvements. Never-
theless, the jury is admonished to find the value of the whole
entity taken and not merely to total the sum of the compo-
nents,3' although it may be asked by two questions to deter-
mine the "before" and "after" value in the case of severance
damages .332
When the trial court is in doubt about the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain an item of damage, 3 a subdivided question
327. Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 37 Wis. 2d 610, 623, 155 N.W.2d 619, 626 (1968);
Johnson v. St. Paul & W. Coal Co., 131 Wis. 627, 630, 111 N.W. 722, 723 (1907).
328. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1750 (lump sum); WIs. J.I.-CIL No. 1754 (subdivided).
329. See Alk, The Submission of the Questions of Damages in Personal Injury
Cases, 1939 Wis. L. REv. 399.
330. Spleas v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 636, 124 N.W.2d
593 (1963); Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d
249 (1959); Smith v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 107 Wis. 35, 82 N.W. 193 (1900).
331. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 8135.
332. WIS. J.I.-CIvIL No. 8100.
333. The deficiency in the evidence may relate to the lack of weikht of the evidence
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enables the court to avoid the risk of retrial by correcting the
verdict in that respect after it has been returned. In the event
of reversal upon review, the appellate court can reinstate the
jury's finding without retrial. Use of the subdivided question
parallels the accepted practice of deferring a doubtful motion
for a directed verdict. 4
Sometimes a subdivided question does not separate all of
the subsidiary issues of damages. In Sawdey v. Schwenk335 the
trial court lumped past and future general damages in one
subdivision but isolated the other damage issues in separate
subdivisions. Although this defeats the value of itemized sub-
mission, it is valid. The same is true if one combines future loss
of earning capacity with permanent disability.33
All instructions, including those pertaining to damage ques-
tions, must be specially correlated to the question or questions
to which they relate. When the ordinary submission of an auto
negligence case was in terms of specific issues, the instructions
had to be cued to the appropriate subdivision of the question. 31
A general negligence question eliminates subdivision correla-
tion with instructions, because there are none. However, as
damage submissions have turned more frequently to itemiza-
tion, the damage instructions must be correlated to the appro-
priate subdivisions . 38 Failure to do so requires a new trial be-
cause it is impossible to determine whether the jury damage
determinations overlapped, thereby assessing double damages.
E. Phrasing The Itemized Damage Inquiries.
In a personal injury action, the term "personal injury" can
cover the entire submission of all damage issues (except prop-
erty damage) simply by incorporating all of the appropriate
instructions for general and special damages. If the case in-
volves past and future damages, one cannot convert that to
"past personal injury" and "future personal injury." "Past per-
sonal injury" is probably an appropriate phrase if the instruc-
or the absence of expert testimony where it is required. See Part I, secs. D & E supra.
334. Davis v. Skille, 12 Wis. 2d 482, 490, 107 N.W.2d 458, 462 (1961).
335. 2 Wis. 2d 532, 87 N.W.2d 500 (1958).
336. Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
337. See Olson v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 266 Wis. 106, 62 N.W.2d 549, 63
N.W.2d 740 (1954).
338. Dunham v. Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co., 228 Wis. 250, 259, 280 N.W. 291, 294
(1938).
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tions limit the damages to those occurring to the date of the
trial, but "future personal injury" suggests a future event
rather than future damage from a past event, and thus is con-
fusing to the jury.39 The writers prefer the submission "per-
sonal injury to date" because it better emphasizes the cut-off
date for the determination than does "past personal injury."
For future damages or permanent injury, if the submission is
warranted by the evidence, the writers prefer "future physical
disability" because of the emphasis on the future .3  The stan-
dard jury instruction for such an inquiry341 speaks of "humilia-
tion, embarrassment, worry and mental distress" which, of
course, are states of mind but relate directly to physical ability
and do not seem confusing or contradictory. If one prefers, that
contention can be resolved by contraction to "future disabil-
ity." The latter form is patently more appropriate if there is
evidence of traumatic neurosis or psychosis.342
In a wrongful death case where the special verdict was item-
ized, the phrase "personal injury" was not erroneous in the
light of the jury instructions, although the more appropriate
submission was "conscious pain and suffering" because that
was the only appropriate damage to consider . 43
Past and future medical, hospital and nursing expenses,
past and future loss of services, society and companionship,
damage to automobile, etc., require no special thought for
itemization provided the evidence justifies the submission.
However, past or future "wage loss" is an improper form of
submission: "In fact, an instruction for damages in a personal
injury suit couched in terms of 'loss of wages' is always incor-
rect. It may not, of course, thereby be unfairly prejudicial, for
in many cases the wage is an accurate gauge of loss of earning
capacity. '344
339. An interesting submission is found in Smith v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 107 Wis.
35, 82 N.W. 193 (1900). Only damages were disputed and then only with respect to
some injuries to certain parts of the body. The special verdict inquired as to the fact
of injury to various parts of the body and inquired with respect to damages to each of
those parts.
340. Alk, The Submission of the Questions of Damages in Personal Injury Cases,
1939 Wis. L. REv. 399.
341. An appropriate modification must be made to Wis. J.I.-CIvIL No. 1750 to
apply only to future damages.
342. See, e.g., Piorkowski v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 455, 228 N.W.2d 695
(1975).
343. Blaisdell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 19, 24, 82 N.W.2d 886, 889 (1957).
344. Carlson v. Drews, Inc., 48 Wis. 2d 408, 417, 1380 N.W.2d 546, 551 (1970). See
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When the only evidence of loss of earning capacity is loss
of wages, it is not prejudicial error to phrase the inquiry in
terms of loss of wages; however, the vice of a "loss of wages"
inquiry is that it is inapplicable to the person who cannot prove
loss of wages but has evidence of inability to perform for gain
services of the type for which he is equipped. Use of the phrase
"loss of earning capacity to date" or "loss of future earning
capacity" is invariably correct and will coordinate with the
pattern jury instructions.34 Where the evidence relates to loss
of business or professional earnings, the pattern instructions
are different, but the inquiry phraseology remains appropri-
ate. 3
Whenever a question inquires about or includes compensa-
tion for a future loss or future expense, a present value
instruction 347 is appropriate, but failure to give the instruction
is not prejudicial error unless counsel has requested it. 311
F. An Inquiry With Respect To Exemplary Damages Cannot
Be Made Unless The Evidence Justifies Submitting An Inquiry
For Compensatory Damages.
Wisconsin has long held that an award of punitive damages
is dependent upon a finding of compensatory damage. 349 If the
evidence does not support the submission of compensatory
damages to the jury, the issue of punitive damages likewise
may not be submitted.
also Bourassa v. Gateway Erectors, Inc., 54 Wis. 2d 176, 194 N.W.2d 602 (1972);
Ballard v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967); Ketterer
v. Moerker, 28 Wis. 2d 463, 137 N.W.2d 385 (1965).
345. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL Nos. 1775, 1753, or in the event of no wage loss evidence, No.
1750; Featherly v. Continental Ins. Co., 73 Wis. 2d 273, 276, 243 N.W.2d 806 (1976).
346. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL Nos. 1750, 1753, 1754, 1780, 1785; Featherly v. Continental
Ins. Co., 73 Wis. 2d 273, 277, 243 N.W.2d 806 (1976).
347. WIs. J.I.-CIIL No. 1796:
In determining the amount of any award to be made, you are instructed that
a sum allowed at this time to compensate for a loss or an expense which will be
incurred in the future must be reduced by you to its present value.
By "present value" is meant such sum which if invested at this time at the
current rate of interest, will produce in principal and interest the amount neces-
sary to fairly and reasonably compensate the injured party for such loss or
expense, if any, as you find he will sustain at a particular time or times in the
future.
348. Bourassa v. Gateway Erectors, Inc., 54 Wis. 2d 176, 194 N.W.2d 602 (1972);
Walker v. Baker, 13 Wis. 2d 637, 109 N.W.2d 499 (1961).
349. D.R.W. Corp. v. Cordes, 65 Wis. 2d 303, 222 N.W.2d 671 (1974); Hanson v.
Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971); Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337,
117 N.W.2d 275 (1962). Wis. J.I. CIVIL No. 1707.
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VI. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN THE INSTRUCTION AND SPECIAL
VERDICT CONFERENCE
An attorney's role in special verdict formulation has been
summarized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
Counsel for the parties have a distinct obligation to aid in the
preparation of special verdicts and to voice objection to the
form of questions, if such questions are objectionable, when
it will afford an opportunity to the trial court to correct them.
Counsel may not accept the language of the trial court as
used in the special verdict without objection, wait and see
whether the answers of the jury are satisfactory, and, if not,
then for the first time complain about the phraseology upon
appeal. 5
The advocate's duty is best served by a proposed or requested
form of special verdict submitted to the court no later than the
special verdict and instruction conference provided by the Wis-
consin Rules of Civil Procedure.351
Failure to request an instruction waives the right to object
to its absence.12 Where the trial court's ruling as a matter of
law precludes a question, no request is necessary. 5 Upon ap-
peal the appellate court may deal only with the issues submit-
ted by the verdict and may not deal with issues not submitted
where there was no request and no objection." 4 In addition, an
objection to a duplicitous question in the verdict is waived by
failure to object.355 Consent to the form of verdict also waives
the right to object.356
350. Nimitz v. Motor Transp. Co., 253 Wis. 362, 364, 34 N.W.2d 116, 118 (1948).
351. Wis. STAT. § 805.13(3) (1973).
352. Sheldon v. Singer, 61 Wis. 2d 443, 213 N.W.2d 5 (1973); Martin v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962); Scalzo v. Marsh, 13 Wis. 2d
126, 108 N.W.2d 163 (1961); Bauman v. Gilbertson, 11 Wis. 2d 627, 106 N.W.2d 298
(1961); Becker v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 456, 99 N.W.2d 804 (1960); Leiske v.
Baudhuin Yacht Harbor, 4 Wis. 2d 188, 89 N.W.2d 794 (1958); Kanzenbach v. S. C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956); Youngerman v. Thiede, 271
Wis. 367, 73 N.W.2d 494 (1956); Szymon v. Johnson, 269 Wis. 153, 70 N.W.2d 5 (1955);
Lind v. Lund, 266 Wis. 232, 63 N.W.2d 313 (1954). See Part II, Sec. F supra.
353. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
354. Walsh v. Wild Masonry Co., 72 Wis. 2d 447, 455, 241 N.W.2d 416 (1976);
DeWitz v. Northern States Power Co., 269 Wis. 548, 69 N.W.2d 431 (1955).
355. Bassil v. Fay, 267 Wis. 265, 64 N.W.2d 826 (1954); Swanson v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 266 Wis. 357, 63 N.W.2d 743 (1954).
356. Chapnitsky v. McClone, 20 Wis. 2d 453, 122 N.W.2d 400 (1963); Kuentzel v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 72, 106 N.W.2d 324 (1961); Schulze v.
Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960); Bensend v. Harper, 2 Wis. 2d 474, 87
N.W.2d 258 (1958); Pedek v. Wegemann, 275 Wis. 57, 81 N.W.2d 49 (1957).
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An objection to the form of the questions or the phraseology
employed must be made specifically 357 and timely.35 The trial
court may call for such objections from counsel before submit-
ting the special verdict to the jury. 59 An attempted oral
amendment of a requested special verdict made just minutes
before closing arguments and submission of the case to the jury
comes too late to afford the trial court an opportunity to con-
sider such a request .3  However, if a verdict can be corrected
by the trial or appellate court by treating some of the questions
and answers in the special verdict as surplusage, the absence
of timely objection will not preclude such action. 31'
The Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure have formalized
the time at which counsel must request the form of the verdict
and questions therein with the appropriate instructions. The
conference between counsel and the trial court prescribed by
Wisconsin Statutes section 805.13(3) occurs between the close
of the evidence and the commencement of argument. At the
conference and on the record, the trial court is required to
dispose of counsels' motions and their instruction and verdict
requests. At that time counsel may object on the record8 2 to the
instructions and verdict, stating the grounds with particular-
ity. Failure to object at that point constitutes a waiver of error
in the instructions or verdict. Such a practice is in conformity
with the earlier case law cited above.
In order to be preserved for review by the appellate court,
objections to errors in special verdicts require not only a timely
objection at the instruction and verdict conference, but also
assignment of error objected to as a basis for a new trial in the
357. Bartz v. Braun, 14 Wis. 2d 425, 111 N.W.2d 431 (1961).
358. Strong v. Herman Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Wis. 2d 214, 105 N.W.2d 268 (1960);
Leiske v. Baudhuin Yacht Harbor, 4 Wis. 2d 188, 89 N.W.2d 794 (1958); Swanson v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 266 Wis. 357, 63 N.W.2d 743 (1954); Briggs Transfer Co. v. Farm-
ers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 369, 61 N.W.2d 305 (1953).
359. Tabak v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 161 Wis. 422, 154 N.W. 694 (1915).
360. Dutcher v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 2d 591, 155 N.W.2d 609 (1968).
361. Roach v. Keane, 73 Wis. 2d 524, 536, 243 N.W.2d 508, 515 (1976); Schulze v.
Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960); Thomas v. Tesch, 268 Wis. 338, 67
N.W.2d 367 (1954).
362. Failure to preserve an objection to a special verdict through the record waives
the error. Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 79 N.W.2d 249
(1956). It now seems necessary that the trial court specifically announce upon the
record the opportunity to counsel to object in order to comply with Wis. STAT. §
805.13(3) (1973).
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trial court motions after verdict.36 3 In accord with the early case
law, the instruction and verdict conference implicitly requires
the formulation of the special verdict before counsels' argu-
ments to the jury."4 "[T]he right of. . .counsel to seek and
secure a form of verdict more precisely tailored . . . was to be
asserted when the special verdict questions were framed.3 65
Ordinarily, questions should not be added to the verdict either
after argument or after the jury charge, although it may be
done in some circumstances where the parties agree, or where
the additional submission is not prejudicial.3 6 When the need
for additional questions becomes apparent and they are formu-
lated, the added questions ought to be submitted immediately
without waiting for the jury to return the original verdict, 6 ' but
not in the absence of counsel.6 Unnecessary and improper
questions, however, may be withdrawn from the special ver-
dict, even after closing argument.6
VII. TRIAL COURT SUPERVISION OVER THE RETURN OF THE JURY'S
SPECIAL VERDICT
Juries on occasion do fail to follow instructions and thus err
in the answers to the special verdict. Sometimes prefatory in-
structions to special verdict questions are overlooked or disre-
garded. When that occurs, the prospect of inconsistency in the
verdict greatly increases. Cause questions may thus be an-
swered affirmatively when the negligence question is answered
negatively or a comparison of negligence is made attributing a
percentage of total causal negligence to a person who has not
been found causally negligent in earlier questions. Sometimes
the sum of the apportioned negligence does not total 100%.
Occasionally damage questions are not anwered or are an-
swered "one day's wages" in response to a loss of earnings
inquiry, despite the dollar sign preface to the blank line for
answer.
363. Chapnitsky v. McClone, 20 Wis. 2d 453, 122 N.W.2d 400 (1963); Bartz v.
Braun, 14 Wis. 2d 425, 111 N.W.2d 431 (1961).
364. Pool v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 56 Wis. 227, 14 N.W. 46 (1882).
365. Mariuzza v. Kenower, 68 Wis. 2d 321, 331-32, 228 N.W.2d 702, 708 (1975).
366. Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 37 Wis. 2d 610, 155 N.W.2d 619 (1968); New Home
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Simon, 104 Wis. 120, 80 N.W. 71 (1899).
367. Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 37 Wis. 2d 610, 155 N.W.2d 619 (1968).
368. Johnson v. Lewis, 151 Wis. 615, 139 N.W. 377 (1913).
369. Matthews v. Town of Sigel, 152 Wis. 123, 139 N.W. 721 (1913).
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Dissents may proliferate because the five-sixths instruction
is disregarded or is simply misunderstood. Frequently, the trial
and appellate courts are confused in the application of the five-
sixths rule and the need for agreement of ten jurors on all
aspects of recovery;7 0 there is thus no persuasive reason why
the jury should understand it from the abbreviated instruction
given. The courts have done little to improve the situation.
Submitting the court's instructions to the jury in writing as
well as delivering them orally tends to reduce the prospect that
the jury will disregard, overlook or misapply an instruction.
If the expenditure of effort in formulating and presenting
the special verdict and instructions is unsuccessful, there re-
mains in the trial court supervisory power to be exercised in
connection with the return of the verdict. When a jury returns
a verdict containing errors, inconsistencies or lack of compli-
ance with the directions of the special verdict and instructions,
the trial court may direct the jury's attention generally to the
prospective error and require it to deliberate further to correct
any errors that may exist .37 In doing so, the trial court must
cautiously avoid suggesting which of the inconsistent answers
is the error and must avoid dominating or dictating how an
error or inconsistency is to be corrected. 311
When excessive dissents are involved, the court must avoid
any hint of coercing any dissenter. Probably the safest ap-
proach is to direct the jury's attention generally to the prospec-
tive error and reread the five-sixths instruction.
The trial court has a duty to inspect the special verdict and
direct the jury to complete its answers.3 13 Exercise of the au-
thority to direct the jury to retire for further deliberations to
370. WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 5; Wis. STAT. § 805.09 (1973); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 1, 117 N.W.2d 708 (1962);
Fleischacker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 215, 79 N.W.2d 817 (1956);
McCauley v. International Trading Co., 268 Wis. 62, 66 N.W.2d 633 (1954); Scipior v.
Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948). However, note the almost imperceptible
shift in Lorbecki v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 463, 182 N.W.2d 226 (1971); Krueger v. Winters,
37 Wis. 2d 204, 155 N.W.2d 1 (1967); and Vogt v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 35
Wis. 2d 716, 151 N.W.2d 713 (1967).
371. Husting v. Dietzen, 224 Wis. 639, 272 N.W. 851 (1937); Jackson v. Robert L.
Reisinger & Co., 219 Wis. 535, 263 N.W. 641 (1935).
372. Topham v. Casey, 262 Wis. 580, 55 N.W.2d 892 (1953); Sherman v. Menomi-
nee River Lumber Co., 77 Wis. 14, 45 N.W. 1079 (1890); Wrightman v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 73 Wis. 169, 40 N.W. 689 (1888).
373. Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co., 256 Wis. 356, 41 N.W.2d 359 (1950); Scipior
v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948).
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correct inconsistencies or errors will usually result in a special
verdict correction that avoids a new trial. Inspection of the
special verdict before it is received and the jury discharged or
disbanded,174 or when returning a sealed verdict, 75 will enable
one to identify at least the obvious errors, inconsistencies 37 or
ambiguities377 and provide an opportunity for correction. In a
multiple party-multiple claim special verdict, the inspection
will require more than a casual glance and a conference with
counsel is helpful. If errors or inconsistencies are discovered,
the special verdict answers should be incorporated in the record
in the jury's absence before being corrected so that the rights
of the parties are preserved. Waiver of a portion of claimed
damages may eliminate dissents or otherwise rectify an incon-
sistency. 38
VIII. THE ELECTION-OF-THEORIES PROBLEM
Wisconsin Statutes section 803.04(1) and 802.02(5)(b) per-
mit widespread alternative joinder of parties, alternative
claims and alternative defenses. If the doctrine of election of
remedies survives in a modem code of civil procedure, it will
not require the election of alternative theories of recovery until
the close of the evidence at trial. 79 When the evidence is closed,
it is the function of either the judge or the jury to make the
election, unless the parties by consenting to the form of the
verdict or by failure to object determine the theory of submis-
sion. If the evidence is insufficient to carry any theory to the
jury, the judge may refuse to submit such a theory in the spe-
cial verdict.38 However, when the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff supports more than one theory of recovery, the plain-
tiff is entitled to have all theories of recovery submitted 3' un-
less (1) the theories are inconsistent,312 or (2) the submission of
374. Junion v. Snavely Motor Co., 186 Wis. 298, 202 N.W. 674 (1925); Victor
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Heller, 44 Wis. 265 (1878).
375. Olwell v. Milwaukee St. Ry., 92 Wis. 330, 66 N.W. 362 (1896).
376. A special verdict is not inconsistent because it allows damages for medical
expenses but allows no damages for personal injuries or pain and suffering. Jahnke v.
Smith, 56 Wis. 2d 642, 653, 203 N.W.2d 67, 73 (1973).
377. Coats v. Town of Stanton, 90 Wis. 130, 62 N.W. 619 (1895).
378. Krueger v. Winters, 37 Wis. 2d 204, 155 N.W.2d 1 (1967).
379. 61 AM. JUR. 2d Pleading §§ 116-18, 222 (1972).
380. Wills v. Regen, 58 Wis. 2d 328, 206 N.W.2d 398 (1973).
381. Krudwig v. Koepke, 223 Wis. 244, 270 N.W. 79 (1936).
382. See text accompanying note 387 infra when the evidence of the plaintiff and
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one theory as a matter of law encompasses another lesser
theory.113
At a time in the development of Wisconsin law when gross
negligence and ordinary negligence were different theories of
recovery, if the evidence supported either theory of recovery,
the special verdict contained inquiries about gross and ordi-
nary negligence.384 However, gross negligence was to be in-
quired about first and the jury was to be instructed (preferably
by a question preface) that the ordinary negligence question
was not to be answered if gross negligence was found by it.3", If
both inquiries were answered, the verdict would be inconsist-
ent.
When safe place statute386 negligence and common law neg-
ligence are alleged, at the close of the evidence the court must
determine whether as a matter of law the plaintiff is within the
safe place statute. 87 If so, then only safe place negligence need
be submitted because the standard of care applied to the defen-
dant's conduct is higher. Thus, if there is no breach of a higher
standard of care, there can be no breach of the lesser standard
of ordinary care. Where the evidence as a matter of law does
not bring the plaintiff within the safe place statute, only ordi-
nary negligence need be submitted.3 8 When the evidence is in
dispute with respect to applicability of the safe place statute,
and if the plaintiff makes proper demand, the special verdict
must submit safe place and ordinary negligence to the jury
because those theories of recovery are merely gradations of neg-
ligence and not inconsistent.3 Of course, the inquiry about
common law negligence should contain a preface instructing
the jury to answer the question only if it has answered the
inquiry about safe place negligence negatively. Answering both
questions might confuse the jury and result in an improper
defendant is in conflict and inconsistent theories on the cause of the event are ad-
vanced.
383. Wills v. Regen, 58 Wis. 2d 328, 206 N.W.2d 398 (1973).
384. Wedel v. Klein, 229 Wis. 419, 282 N.W. 606 (1938).
385. Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 638-41, 76 N.W.2d 563,
568-71 (1956); Wedel v. Klein, 229 Wis. 419, 424, 282 N.W. 606, 608-09 (1938).
386. Wis. STAT. § 101.11 (1973).
387. See Haefner v. Batz Seed Farms, Inc., 255 Wis. 438, 39 N.W.2d 386 (1949).
388. Metcalf v. Consolidated Badger Co-op., 28 Wis. 2d 552, 137 N.W. 2d 457
(1965).
389. See Carr v. Amusements, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 368, 177 N.W.2d 388 (1970); Petosky
v. Schmidt, 21 Wis. 2d 323, 124 N.W.2d 1 (1963).
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comparison of negligence.
The foregoing submission on varying theories of recovery
are easily justifiable. In the safe place-ordinary negligence
case, safe place negligence is the greater responsibility of the
defendant. If he has failed to meet the greater standard of care,
there is no need to inquire about the lesser standard. In the
gross negligence-ordinary negligence situations, as the theories
formerly existed, gross negligence was a form of intentional
conduct exempting the plaintiff from a diminished recovery
because of his contributory negligence. Thus, it was unneces-
sary to consider the prospect of lesser recovery under ordinary
negligence and the possibility of inconsistency in the verdict
was eliminated.
When the plaintiff at trial offers evidence in support of
liability because of 402 A negligence39 (negligence per se in
Wisconsin) and also because of ordinary negligence, the need
to submit both theories of negligence recovery exists for the
reasons stated above. 9' In Howe v. Deere & Co.392 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court declined to determine whether an inquiry
regarding ordinary negligence should precede an inquiry con-
cerning 402 A negligence or whether only one question of
negligence should be submitted with appropriate instructions
on both negligence theories. The matter was consigned to the
discretion of the trial court.
If separate inquiries are made with respect to 402 A negli-
gence per se and ordinary negligence, the special verdict may
require two cause questions, two comparison questions, a third
question in the event of issues of ordinary negligence of defen-
dants and contribution between defendants that may be liable
under 402 A or ordinary negligence, and the necessary damage
questions. It would seem preferable to submit the inquiry with
respect to 402 A negligence first because of the relative ease of
proof, although some attorneys are fearful that recovery on that
theory is more difficult than had been expected because the
jury must find the defective product to be "unreasonably dan-
gerous." It seems to the writers that other attorneys will com-
plain that the jury's determination of negligence is obscured by
inquiring about ordinary negligence first, because the issue of
390. See note 188 supra.
391. See also Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
392. Id.
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402 A negligence would not then be apparent. This is so be-
cause the jury would not be required to answer 402 A inquiries
if the ordinary negligence question was answered affirmatively.
A special verdict form experimenting in separate inquiries
with respect to 402 A negligence and ordinary negligence is set
forth as Appendix VI. The fact situation assumed is as follows:
P, an invitee, was injured at an automobile repair shop
when an automobile transmission was being unloaded from a
common carrier delivery truck. A portable crane being used by
a mechanic (M) and the truck driver (TD) to unload the truck
tipped and the load struck and injured P.
P sues the auto repair shop, the common carrier, the crane
manufacturer (CM) and the crane distributor (CD). The plead-
ings and the evidence put in issue the negligence of M and TD
in the unloading process, and negligence of CM in manufactur-
ing the crane and CD in assembling the crane. Also in issue is
the strict liability of CM for a design defect and the strict
liability of CD for misassembly. All of the defendants have
cross-claimed for contribution.
Special verdict inquiries with respect to common law negli-
gence of M, TD and P are included. Inquiries with respect to
strict liability and common law negligence of CM and CD are
also included.
The first comparison question is invoked to compare the
negligence if strict liability is applicable and the plaintiff and
other defendants are possibly causally negligent at common
law. To aid the jury in eliminating from the comparison those
persons not found strictly liable or causally negligent, the in-
struction with reference to a "zero" answer is inserted in each
subdivision.393
The second comparison question determines the contribu-
tion rights between the crane manufacturer and the crane dis-
tributor. The third comparison question compares the negli-
gence of the respective persons or parties in the event that
strict liability is not applicable.
The last question is an alternate to the damage question if
the action is brought for indemnification or contribution when
settlement has been made with the injured party by one or
more of the persons or parties who are allegedly at fault. The
393. The format is the same as in Wis. J.I.-CIVIL No. 1592.
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strict liability, negligence, cause and comparison questions
would be the same.
Wisconsin Jury Instruction- Civil Number 3290 recom-
mends incorporating in a products special verdict, comparisons
of "product" and other person's negligence as well as compari-
son of the negligence of the strictly liable defendants to each
other. Four results are grounded in the two comparisons:
(1) The percentage of causal negligence of all persons (in-
cluding the plaintiff's contributory negligence) is obtained. 9'
(2) The persons whose conduct contributed to the "product
negligence" have their conduct compared to each other.95
(3) A comparison of "product negligence" to other negli-
gence.311
(4) The determination of joint liability if it is disputed in
the evidence.397
When the pleadings allege negligence and strict liability in
tort and the evidence supports both theories, product negli-
gence comparisons seem to make formulation of a special ver-
dict complicated and lengthy. By eliminating the product neg-
ligence comparison in Appendix VI through the use of alternate
Question 15, the authors believe the jury is denied the oppro-
tunity for internal inconsistency except in one respect. It is
possible for a "person" in the chain of supply nearer to the
buyer to be exculpated by the jury although "he" incorporated
into the end product a defective component supplied to him.
However, that happenstance is only legally inconsistent, not
factually inconsistent, and thus the court upon ordering judg-
ment may merely modify the verdict to conform with the law
that those in the chain of supply are jointly liable. If there is a
factual issue, it may be resolved by the jury in inquiries about
the "business of selling" and "substantially the same condi-
tion."
394. The same result, however, can as easily be obtained in a one-comparison
question inquiring about all of the parties whose conduct contributed to the "injury."
395. This is simply an intermediate mathematical step that is unnecessary and can
be eliminated by a single comparison which contains inquiries with respect to compar-
ing all relevant conduct.
396. This is merely a reminder that those in the chain of supply of a defective and
unreasonably dangerous product are strictly liable to the consumer. There is no need
for the jury to remind the lawyers and the judge of the law.
397. In that event, additional questions relating to "the business of selling" and
"substantially the same condition" are factual determinants to be resolved by the jury.
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The present forms of special verdict and instructions are
easily adaptable to a single-question submission of 402 A negli-
gence and ordinary negligence. A single-question submission of
402 A and ordinary negligence requires combination of the
strict liability and ordinary negligence instructions in applica-
tion to an inquiry about negligence. The causation question can
inquire whether "such defective condition or negligence" was
a cause of the "injury." The comparative negligence question
and damage question can be in the usual form. A simple one
sentence paragraph may be added to the definition of negli-
gence: "In addition to this general definition of negligence,
there are laws governing the business of selling a defective
product in an unreasonably dangerous condition, a violation of
which is negligence as that term is used in the special verdict
and these instructions."
The determination of the joint liability of the defendants
can be made by the court as a matter of law unless the evidence
is in dispute. That dispute would be in the form of evidence
that some or all of the defendants were not in the business of
selling the products or its components or that the product or
its components did not reach the consumer in substantially the
same condition. In that case, inquiries with respect to the
"business of selling" and acquisition by the consumer in "sub-
stantially the same condition" can be keyed to the individual
negligence inquiries. The questions appear as numbers 4 and 5
in the comment to Wisconsin Jury Instruction-Civil Number
3290. The answers to those questions will then determine joint
strict liability.
Such a special verdict form would differ from the usual
negligence form of submission as we now know it, only in the
prospect of the additional questions with respect to the "busi-
ness of selling" and "substantially the same condition." The
special verdict form is thus greatly simplified.
However, whether 402 A negligence, as opposed to common
law negligence, was found by the jury will not be ascertainable.
This will result in obscuring the product liability of the person
who placed the product into the stream of commerce for the
defects attributable to component suppliers or assemblers.
The liability to the injured person of a defendant, whether
a seller, distributor, manufacturer or component supplier, is
arrived at by different routes in negligence and strict liability
for torts, with "foreseeability of harm" being the route in the
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first instance and "sale of a product in substantially the same
condition" in the second instance. Whether the liability of per-
sons in the chain of supply is to become joint is dependent on
the question whether each defendant is in the business of sell-
ing the product and whether it reached the consumer in sub-
stantially the same condition. In the ordinary case that will be
without dispute and thus there is no reason why the "negli-
gence" of the defendants cannot be determined as a matter of
law to be joint. However, if the evidence is in dispute with
respect to whether a defendant is in the chain of supply, and
that defendant is not found causally negligent, the verdict will
not determine whether he is in the chain of supply and jointly
liable. In such a case a special inquiry of fact is required.
The ultimate fact "fault" verdict and instructions found in
Wisconsin Jury Instruction-Civil Number 1001 are readily
adaptable. A "fault" special verdict involving issues of 402 A
and ordinary negligence has been experimented with; it
appears as Appendix VII and assumes the same facts as Appen-
dix VI.
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APPENDICES
The appendices which follow are an attempt to summarize
and to illustrate some of the positive rather than negative prin-
ciples of special verdict formulation. The italicized and paren-
thetical material identifies the alternatives that may be chosen
to fit the specific situation posed by the evidence. Not all of the
alternatives can be suggested because of the infinite variations
in case types and the variety of evidentiary circumstances. At
best only some of the more frequently encountered problems of
special verdict formulation are illustrated.
APPENDIX I
Special Verdict Worksheet - Ultimate Fact Negligence
Question No. 1
(At and just before) (At and before) (At the time and place in
question) (At the time and place of)
the
(fall of the plaintiff )
(injury to the plaintiff ) (if any)
(accident) (collision)
was the defendant negligent with
respect to
(the operation of his motor vehicle?)
(signalling a turn?) (signalling?)
(maintaining the loading platform as safe as the nature of the
place reasonably permitted?)
(maintenance of his premises?)
(administering a permanent wave to the plaintiff?)
(her duties as a physical education teacher?)
(the care and maintenance of the chair in question?)
(the maintenance and manner of repair of the stair tread of the
second step?)
(marking the cable gate so as to warn snowmobilers of its exist-
ence?)
Answer:
Question No. 2
If you answer Question (1) "yes," then answer this question:
Was such negligence of the defendant a
cause of the (fall of the plaintiff ) (injury
to the plaintiff ) (if any) (accident) (collision)?
Answer:
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Question No. 3
(At and just before) (At and before) (At the time and place in
question) (At the time and place of)
the
(fall of the plaintiff )
(injury to the plaintiff ) (if any)
(accident) (collision)
was the plaintiff negligent with respect to
(operation of his motor vehicle?)
(signalling?) (signalling a [left] [right] turn?)
(caring for his own safety?)
(care and protection for his own safety?)
(operation of his snowmobile?)
Answer:
Question No. 4
If you answer Question (3) "yes," then answer this question:
Was such negligence of the plaintiff , a cause of the
(fall of the plaintiff ) (injury to the plaintiff
) (if any) (accident) (collision)?
Answer:
Question No. 5
If you have answered Questions (2) and (4) "yes," then and
only then answer this question: Taking the combined neglig-
ence which caused the (fall of the plaintiff )
(injury to the plaintiff .) (if any)
(accident) (collision) as 100 %, what percentage of such neglig-
ence is attributable to:
(a) the defendant _ Answer:_%
(b) the plaintiff Answer: -_ %
Total: 100%
Question No. 6
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) personal injuries to date? Answer: $
(b) future personal disability? Answer: $
(c) medical (and hospital) (and
drug expenses) to date? Answer: $
(d) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses? Answer: $
(e) loss of earning capacity to date? Answer: $
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(f) future loss of earning capacity?
(g) damage to ?
Answer: $
Answer: $
Question No. 7
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) loss of services, society and companionship of (his)
(her) (wife, ) (husband )?
Answer: $
(b) medical (and hospital) (and drug) expenses to date?
Answer: $
(c) future medical (and hospital) (and drug) expenses?
Answer: $
Dated at , Wisconsin this - day of
19 .
Dissenting Jurors
(Forelady)
as to
(foreman)
Question or Subdivision
No.
APPENDIX II
Special Verdict Worksheet - Specific Issues Negligence
Question No. 1
(At and just before) (At and before) (At the time and place in
question) (At the time and place of)
the
(fall of the plaintiff )
(injury to the plaintiff ) (if any)
(accident) (collision)
was the defendant , negligent with respect to:
[ (a) Repairing the stairway? Answer:
[ (b) (installing) (maintaining)
(repairing) (affixing) the
floor covering? Answer:
[ (c) (Mopping) (waxing) (polishing)
the floor?
[ (d) Lookout? Answer:
[ (e) Speed? Answer:
[ (f) Right of way? Answer:
[Vol. 60:201
SPECIAL VERDICT FORMULATION
(g) Manner of making his turn?
(h) Signalling?
Answer: - 1
Answer: -
Question No. 2
If you answer any subdivision of Question (1) "yes," then an-
swer the corresponding subdivision of this question: Was such
negligence of the defendant , a cause of the
(fall of the plaintiff )
(injury to the plaintiff .) (if any)
(accident) (collision) with respect to:
[ (a) Repairing the stairway? Answer: 
[ (b) (Installing) (maintaining)
(repairing) (affixing) the
floor covering? Answer: ]
[ (c) (Mopping) (waxing) (polishing)
the floor? Answer: I
[ (d) Lookout? Answer: ]
(e) Speed?
(f) Right of way?
(g) Manner of making his turn?
(h) Signalling?
Answer: -
Answer: ]
Answer: 
Answer: I
Question No. 3
(At and just before) (At and before) (At the time and place in
question) (At the time and place of)
the
(fall of the plaintiff )
(injury to the plaintiff ) (if any)
(accident) (collision)
was the plaintiff negligent with respect to:f (a) Disregarding a warning? Answer: - 1
[ (b) Grasping a hand rail? Answer: ]f (c) Choosing his path of travel? Answer: - 1f (d) Lookout? Answer: ]
[ (e) Speed? Answer: - 1f (f) Right of way? Answer. I
Question No. 4
If you answer any subdivision of Question (3) "yes," then an-
swer the corresponding subdivision of this question: Was such
negligence of the plaintiff a cause of the
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(fall of the plaintiff )
(injury to the plaintiff .) (if any)
(accident) (collision) with respect to:
[ (a) Disregarding a warning? Answer:
[ (b) Grasping a hand rail? Answer:f (c) Choosing his path of travel? Answer:
[ (d) Lookout? Answer:
[ (e) Speed? Answer:
[ (f) Right of way? Answer:
]]
]
I
]
]
Question No. 5
If you have answered any subdivision of Question (2) "yes,"
and if you have answered any subdivision of Question (4)
"yes," then and only then answer this question: Taking the
combined negligence which caused the
(fall of the plaintiff .)
(injury to the plaintiff ) (if any)
(accident) (collision) as 100%, what percentage of such neglig-
ence is attributable to:
(a) the defendant 
_ Answer: _%
(b) the plaintiff Answer: _%
Total: 100%
Question No. 6
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) personal injuries to date?
(b) future personal disability?
(c) medical (and hospital) (and
drug) expenses to date?
(d) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses?
(e) loss of earning capacity to date?
(f) future loss of earning capacity?
(g) damage to 9
Answer: $
Answer: $
Answer: $
Answer:
Answer:
Answer:
Answer:
$
$
$
$
Question No. 7
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonable compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) loss of services, society and companion-
ship of (his) (her) (wife )
(husband ? Answer: $
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(b) medical (and hospital) (and
drug) expenses to date? Answer: $
(c) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses? Answer: $
Dated at , Wisconsin this - day of
19 .
(Forelady) (Foreman)
Dissenting Jurors as to - Question or Subdivision
No. No.
APPENDIX III
Special Verdict Worksheet - 402 A Negligence
Question No. 1
Was (name of product), when it left the possession of the seller,
in such defective condition as to be unreasonably dangerous to
a prospective (user) (consumer)? Answer:
Question No. 2
If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer this question:
Was such defective condition a cause of plaintiff's injuries?
Answer:
Question No. 3
Was the plaintiff negligent with respect to his own safety?
Answer:
Question No. 4
If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer this question:
Was such negligence a cause of his injuries?
Answer:
Question No. 5
If you have answered Questions No. 1 and 2 "yes," then such
conduct on the part of the seller constitutes negligence and
requires, if you have also answered Questions No. 3 and 4
"yes," that you answer the following questions on comparative
negligence:
Assuming the total negligence that caused plaintiff's injuries to
be 100%, what percentage thereof do you attribute to:
(a) The Product? Answer: %
(b) The Plaintiff?. Answer: - %
Total: 100%
Question No. 6
If you have answered Questions No. 1 and 2 "yes," then such
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conduct on the part of the seller, manufacturer, assembler
and distributor (jobber, manufacturer's agent, dealer, etc.) is
negligence and requires you to answer this question:
Assuming the total negligence of the product to be 100%, what
percentage of negligence, if any, do you attribute to:
(a) the manufacturer? Answer: _%
(b) the assembler? Answer: _%
(c) the dealer? Answer: _%
(d) the seller? Answer: _%
Total: 100%
Question No. 7
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) personal injuries to date?
(b) future personal disability?
(c) medical (and hospital) (and
drug) expenses to date?
(d) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses?
(e) loss of earning capacity to date?
(f) future loss of earning capacity?
(g) damage to _
Answer: $
Answer: $
Answer: $
Answer:
Answer:
Answer:
Answer:
$
$
$
$
Question No. 8
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) loss of services, society and
companionship of (his) (her)
(wife, )
(husband, )? Answer: $
(b) medical (and hospital) (and
drug) expenses to date? Answer: $
(c) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses? Answer: $
Dated at , Wisconsin, this - day of .,
19 _ .
Dissenting Jurors
(Forelady)
as to
(Foreman)
Question or Sub-
division No.
[Vol. 60:201
SPECIAL VERDICT FORMULATION
APPENDIX IV
Special Verdict Worksheet - Specific Issues 402 A
Negligence
Question No. 1
Was the crane, when it left the possession of the seller in such
defective condition as to be unreasonably dangerous to a pro-
spective user with respect to:
[ (a) structural strength of the
boom? Answer: ]
[ (b) over-rating the lifting capacity of
the crane? Answer: ]
[ (c) adequate operational warning
devices? Answer: .
[ (d) adequate side-load and level-
operation warnings? Answer: J
Question No. 2
If you answer any subdivision of Question No. 1 "yes," then
answer the corresponding subdivision of this question:
Was such defective condition a cause of the crane boom buck-
ling with respect to:
[ (a) structural strength of the
boom?
[ (b) over-rating the lifting capacity
of the crane?
[ (c) adequate operational warning
devices?
[ (d) adequate side-load and level-
operation warnings?
Answer: ]
Answer: I
Answer: I
Answer: I
Question No. 3
Was the Brown Engineering Company negligent with respect
to maintaining the construction site and the crane which was
used thereon as safe as the nature of the place would reason-
ably permit with respect to:
(a) the manner of operation of the crane by William Jones?
Answer:
(b) the supervision and direction of Walter Smith?
Answer:
Question No. 4
If you answer any subdivision of Question No. 3 "yes," then
answer the corresponding subdivision of this question: Was
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such negligence a cause of the crane boom buckling with re-
spect to:
(a) the manner of operation of the crane by William Jones?
Answer:
(b) the supervision and direction of Walter Smith?
Answer:
Question No. 5
If you have answered any subdivision of Question No. 2 "yes,"
then such conduct on the part of the seller constitutes causal
negligence and requires, if you have also answered any subdivi-
sion of Question No. 4 "yes," that you answer the following
questions on comparative negligence: Assuming the total neg-
ligence that caused the accident to be 100%, what percentage
thereof do you attribute to:
(a) the defendant crane company? Answer: %
(b) the Brown Engineering Company?
Answer: _%
Total: 100%
Question No. 6
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) personal injuries to date? Answer: $
(b) future personal disability? Answer: $
(c) medical (and hospital) (and
drug) expenses to date? Answer: $
(d) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses? Answer: $
(e) loss of earning capacity to
date? Answer: $
(f) future loss of earning capacity? Answer: $
Question No. 7
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) loss of services, society and
companionship of (his) (her)
(wife, )
(husband, )? Answer: $
(b) future loss of services, society
and companionship of (his)
(her) (wife, )
(husband, )? Answer: $
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(c) nursing care and services
furnished to (his) (her)
(wife .)
(husband ) to date? Answer: $
(d) future nursing care and services
furnished to (his) (her)
(wife )
(husband )? Answer: $
Dated at , Wisconsin this - day of
19-.
Dissenting Jurors
(Forelady)
as to
(Foreman)
Question or Subdivi-
sion No.
APPENDIX V
"Fault" Verdict Worksheet.
Question No. 1
In what percentage, if any, do you find the defendant
at fault? Answer: .%
Question No. 2
In what percentage, if any, do you find the plaintiff
at fault? Answer: ._
Question No. 3
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonably compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
(a) personal injuries to date?
(b) future personal disability?
(c) medical (and hospital) (and
drug) expenses to date?
(d) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses?
(e) loss of earning capacity to date?
(f) future loss of earning capacity?
(g) damage to _
Answer: $
Answer: $
Answer: $
Answer:
Answer:
Answer:
Answer:
$
$
$
$
Question No. 4
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what sum of
money will fairly and reasonabld compensate (him) (her) with
respect to:
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(a) loss of services, society and com-
panionship of (his) (her) (wife,
) (husband, ?
Answer: $
(b) medical (and hospital) (and
drug) expenses to date? Answer: $
(c) future medical (and hospital)
(and drug) expenses? Answer: $
Dated at , Wisconsin this - day of
19 __ .
(Forelady) (Foreman)
Dissenting Jurors as to Question or Subdivision
No. No.
APPENDIX VI
Special Verdict Worksheet - 402 A and Ordinary
Negligence
Question No. 1
Was the crane when it left the possession of CM in such
defective condition as to be unreasonably dangerous to a pro-
spective (user) (consumer) (bystander)? Answer:
Question No. 2
If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer this ques-
tion: Was such defective condition a cause of P's injury?
Answer:
Question No. 3
Was the crane when it left the possession of CD in such
defective condition as to be unreasonably dangerous to a pro-
spective (user) (consumer) (bystander)? Answer:
Question No. 4
If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer this ques-
tion: Was such defective condition a cause of P's injury?
Answer:
Question No. 5
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," or do not answer it, then
answer this question: Was the defendant CM negligent with
respect to manufacturing the crane in question?
Answer:
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Question No. 6
If you answer Question No. 5 "yes," then answer this ques-
tion: Was such negligence of the defendant CM a cause of P's
injury?
Answer:
Question No. 7
If you answer Question No. 4 "no," or do not answer it, then
answer this question: Was the defendant CD negligent with
respect to assembling the crane in question?
Answer:
Question No. 8
If you answer Question No. 7 "yes," then answer this ques-
tion: Was such negligence of the defendant CD a cause of P's
injury?
Answer:
Question No. 9
At and just before (the accident) (P's injury) was M negli-
gent with respect to the manner of unloading the automobile
transmission?
Answer:
Question No. 10
If you answer Question No. 9 "yes," then answer this ques-
tion: Was such negligence of M a cause of (the accident) (P's
injury)?
Answer:
Question No. 11
At and just before (the accident) (P's injury) was TD negli-
gent with respect to the manner of unloading the automobile
transmission?
Answer:
Question No. 12
If you answer Question No. 11 "yes," then answer this ques-
tion: Was such negligence of TD a cause of (the accident) (P's
injury)?
Answer:
Question No. 13
At and just before (the accident) (P's injury) was P negli-
gent with respect to care for his own safety?
Answer:
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Question No. 14
If you answer Question No. 13 "yes," then answer this ques-
tion: Was such negligence of P a cause of (the accident) (his
injury)?
Answer:
Question No. 15
If you have answered either Questions No. 2 or 4 "yes," then
such conduct on the part of CM, or CD, or both, constitutes
negligence and requires, if you have answered any of Questions
No. 10, 12, or 14 "yes," that you answer the following questions
of comparative negligence: Assuming the total negligence that
caused the (accident) (injury to P) to be 100 percent, what
percentage thereof do you attribute to:
(a) The Crane? Answer: .%
(b) CM? Answer: %
[If you have answered Question No. 2 "yes," or have an-
swered Question No. 6 "no," or have not answered it, insert
"'zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(c) CD? Answer: .%
[If you have answered Question No. 4 "yes," or have an-
swered Question No. 8 "no," or have not answered it, insert
"'zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(d) M? Answer: _ .%_
[If you have answered Question No. 10 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(e) TD? Answer: _%
[If you have answered Question No. 12 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(f) P? Answer: _%
[If you have answered Question No. 14 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
Total: 100%
Question No. 16
If you have answered Question No. 15(a) other than "zero,"
then answer this question: Assuming the total negligence of the
crane to be 100%, what percentage of negligence do you attrib-
ute to:
(a) CM? Answer: _%
[If you have answered Question No. 2 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" as your answer.]
(b) CD? Answer: _%
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[If you have answered Question No. 4 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" as your answer.]
Total: 100%
Question No. 17
If you have answered Question No. 15, do not answer this
question. If you have not answered Question No. 15 and you
have answered two or more of questions Nos. 6, 8, 10, 12 and
14 "yes," then answer this question: Assuming the total neglig-
ence that caused the (accident) (injury to P) to be 100%, what
percentage thereof do you attribute to:
(a) CM? Answer: _ T7_
[If you have answered Question No. 6 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(b) CD? Answer: _
[If you have answered Question No. 8 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(c) M? Answer: -%_
[If you have answered Question No. 10 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(d) TD? Answer: %
[If you have answered Question No. 12 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
(e) P? Answer: %
[If you have answered Question No. 14 "no," or have not
answered it, insert "zero" in answer to this subdivision.]
Total: 100%
Alternate to prior Questions 15, 16 and 17.
Question No. 15
If you have answered two or more of Questions 2, 4, 6, 8, 10,
12 and 14 "yes," (a "yes" answer to any of Questions 2 or 6 is
conduct on the part of the defendant inquired about which
constitutes negligence) then answer this question of compara-
tive negligence.
Assuming the total negligence that caused the injury to the
plaintiff to be 100 percent, what percentage do you attribute
to:
(a) CM? Answer: _%
[Unless you have answered either Questions 2 or 6 "yes,"
insert "zero" as your answer to this subdivision.]
(b) CD? Answer: _ _
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[Unless you have answered either Questions 4 or 8 "yes,"
insert "zero" as your answer to this subdivision.]
(c) M? Answer: .%
[Unless you have answered Question 10 "yes," insert
''zero" as your answer to this subdivision.]
(d) TD? Answer: %
[Unless you have answered Question 12 "yes," insert
''zero" as your answer to this subdivision.]
(e) P? Answer: .%
[Unless you have answered Question 14 "yes," insert
''zero" as your answer to this subdivision.]
Total: 100%
Question No. 18
[See damage question No. 6 in Appendix IV.]
Question No. 19
Regardless of your answers to previous questions, you must
answer this question: Was the amount of $ paid by
to P, reasonable? Answer:
[This question and Question No. 20 are alternates to Ques-
tion 18, if the action is alternatively for indemnification or
contribution.]
Question No. 20
If your answer to Question No. 19 is "no," then answer this
question: What sum of money would reasonably compensate P
for his injury and damages sustained in the accident?
Answer: $
APPENDIX VII
"Fault" Special Verdict Worksheet - 402 A and
Ordinary Negligence
Question No. 1
If in your deliberations you have found that the crane was
in such defective condition when it left the possession of CM
or CD, as to be unreasonably dangerous to a prospective (user)
(consumer) (bystander) and have further found that such
defective condition was a cause of P's injury, but you have
further found that neither CM or CD was causally negligent in
other respects with respect to P's injury, then answer this ques-
tion:
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(a) In what percentage do you find
the product (crane) at fault?
(b) In what percentage, if any, do
. you find M at fault?
(c) In what percentage, if any, do
you find TD at fault?
(d) In what percentage, if any, do
you find P at fault?
Answer: .%
Answer:
Answer: %
Answer:
Total: 100%
Question No. 2
If you answer Question No. 1, then answer this question:
Assuming the defective condition that you found to be a cause
of P's injury to be 100%, what percentage thereof do you attrib-
ute to:
(a) CM? Answer: %
(b) CD? Answer: %
Total: 100%
Question No. 3
If you have answered Question No. 1 and in your delibera-
tions have found that either CM or CD or both were causally
negligent with respect to P's injury in addition to an unreason-
ably dangerous defective condition that was a cause of P's in-
jury, then answer this question:
(a) In what percentage do you find
CM at fault?
(b) In what percentage do you find
CD at fault?
(c) In what percentage, if any, do
you find M at fault?
(d) In what percentage, if any, do
you find TD at fault?
(e) In what percentage, if any, do
you find P at fault?
Question No. 4
[See appendix V, Question No. 3.]
Answer:
Answer: %
Answer: .%
Answer: %
Answer:
Total: 100%
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